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Introduction 
The Effects of Regulatory Threats and Strategic Bargaining 
on Firms' Voluntary Participation in Pollution Reduction Programs 
by: Claire M. Jahns 
After years of intense debate, global climate change has finally been acknowledged as a 
serious threat to global biological, political and economic systems. There is overwhelming evidence 
that the atmospheric wanning observed over the course of the past 50 years, as well as the 
increasing incidence of extreme weather events and floods, is being caused by the acceleration of 
the rate in which greenhouse gases (GRGs) produced by the burning of fossil fuels are being 
released into the atmosphere (IPCC: 2001). The extreme weather and weather-related events 
associated with climate change, such as landslides and flooding, totaled roughly $40 billion in the 
1990s (IPCC: 200l-b, 13). It is not surprising, then, that the governments of many developed and 
developing nations, as well as intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations and the World 
Bank, have adopted a variety of measures to reduce GRG emissions and mitigate the potential 
impacts of climatic change. The government of Slovakia sold credits for 200,000 metric tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalents to a Japanese trading house at an undisclosed price on December 6, 
2002, making history by signing the first deal to be officially credited within the international 
Kyoto Protocol, a global agreement to reduce the GRG emissions of participating countries seven 
percent relative to their 1990 levels by 2010 (Gardner: 2002). Nor is it surprising that 
environmental interest groups and active citizens in the United States and elsewhere are pressing 
their elected leaders to pass stricter regulations on the emission of GRGs. 
What is somewhat baffling, though, is the number of privately owned companies that have 
taken it upon themselves to voluntarily reduce GRG emissions as a way to address climate change 
in recent years. Dozens of companies are voluntarily participating in the design and 
implementation of GRG emission reductions programs.) For example, the International Emissions 
Trading Association (lET A) lists 47 international members including Gaz de France, British 
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Petroleum, Shell International Limited, Norsk Hydro and Unocal.2 Private for-profit groups like 
the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a pilot emissions reduction credit (ERC) trading program, 
and C02e.com, Cantor Fitzgerald's online emission trading market, are forming partnerships with 
private companies to devise strategies for reducing emissions in the quickest and most cost-
effective manner. Government programs like the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Trading 
Pilot (GERT) in Canada and other programs in France and the United Kingdom are forming 
similar partnerships. Nonprofit environmental groups like Environmental Defense and the World 
Wildlife Fund have their own, similar pilot projects. Most of these voluntary programs are centered 
around emissions trading, a policy tool commonly utilized for its cost effectiveness and ability to 
yield abatement results. 
It is unexpected for a firm to voluntarily reorganize its operations, design and implement 
new policies and practices, retrain existing staff or hire new staff or purchase pollution-control 
devices because such actions impose additional costs on the firm if mandatory pollution-control 
legislation does not exist (Welch et. al.: 2002). A stable climate is a public good: it is non-
excludable, and is therefore able to be used or abused by anyone. The expenditures of private 
firms, on the other hand, are usually made to produce goods that are sold and bought for private 
profit. Pollution, the inevitable byproduct of business, is known as a negative pecuniary externality 
in economic terms, meaning that it has negative effects on a third party, i.e., society at large, that are 
not fully accounted for in the price of the company's product. Environmental regulation is enacted 
to protect public goods like air and water by reducing the incidence of negative externalities with 
taxes, fees, technological requirements and other measures designed to force a firm to internalize 
the social costs of production. A company whose actions fall under the jurisdiction of 
governmental regulation must privately bear the costs of protecting public goods, although those 
costs are passed on to consumers whenever possible. On the other hand, if laws regulating the 
emission of carbon dioxide and other GHGs do not exist, as is presently the case in the United 
States, then a company does not need to spend revenues on pollution control. Herein lies the heart 
of this paper: why would a rational, profit-maximizing company voluntarily comply with, or help to 
design, a program intended to impose limits on GHG emissions to avoid the public "bad" of 
climate change? By doing so, a company is, theoretically, voluntarily internalizing some or all of 
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the negative external costs associated with GHG pollution. In other words, the company is 
imposing costs on itself to come into compliance with voluntary rules, and may even have to pay 
enforcement penalties if the rules are not obeyed. From the standpoint of a cost-benefit analysis, an 
unregulated firm must see some private benefit to these additional expenditures, unless the firm is 
acting in a completely altruistic manner. Ruling out total altruism, the private benefits of voluntarily 
reducing GHG emissions or participating in the design process of an emissions reduction policy or 
program must outweigh the costs for those firms that choose to voluntarily take action. 
This paper is an investigation into how the private benefits of engagement in GHG 
abatement projects and qUalitative background elements are perceived by profit-maximizing firms, 
and of how and why firms decide to voluntarily improve their environmental records and, therefore, 
mitigate the impending threat of global climatic change. Particular attention is paid to the factors 
that might prompt a firm to voluntarily reduce its emissions through participation in a model or 
pilot GHG allowance or credit trading system like GERT, C02e.com or the CCX. Chapter One 
explains the theoretical underpinnings of general voluntary participation as they apply to individual 
firms, with supporting evidence from the emerging participation in GHG abatement programs. 
This section of the paper presents the hypothesis that a rising threat of mandatory regulation 
affects firms' perceptions of the costs and benefits of voluntary emissions reductions. The threat 
of mandatory rules in the future manifests "new" benefits and changes the relative size of existing 
benefits for frrms considering voluntary abatements. Chapter Two lays out the structure of a 
voluntary chemical use and release mitigation program called the 33/50 Program (henceforth: 
Program), which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ran from 1991 to 1995, and 
existing theoretical and empirical models of the strictly economic and fmancial factors that 
contribute to a frrm's decision to participate in that Program. Next, Chapter Three presents and 
describes an empirical model of state-level participation in the 33/50 Program that is used to 
quantitatively examine the regulatory, political and economic factors that promote or discourage 
voluntary participation. The empirical model examines how public sentiment and the relative 
bargaining powers of private manufacturing industries within a state and public governmental 
bodies work to affect participation rates among polluters in each state, as well as how economic 
factors like unemployment rates, average manufacturing frrm size and the structure of a state's 
economy impact Program participation rates. The results of the empirical model appear in Chapter 
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Four, as does the analysis of the model. In Chapter Five, lessons are drawn from the empirical 
analysis to shed light on the current state of the GHG emissions abatement programs and trading 
markets. The policy implications of the findings are discussed in Chapter Five, and specific 
recommendations made as to how to promote participation in voluntary GHG abatement programs. 
The empirical evidence, together with the underlying political-economic theories, suggest that the 
threat of impending mandatory regulation can make voluntary participation seem increasingly 
desirable to firms, but that actually attempting to impose those laws would force the regulator into a 
strategic bargaining game with finns. Rather than enter into this game, which must be played to 
induce some firms to install equipment for compliance that costs more than the penalties under a 
command-and-control regime, the costs of compliance, either voluntary or mandatory, can be 
lowered significantly by instituting an emissions permit trading system. By providing incentives 
for compliance rather than disincentives for noncompliance, smart policy-makers can promote 
emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost to firms and society. 
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Chapter One 
The Theoretical Underpinnings of Voluntary Participation 
There is a sizable body of theoretical and empirical literature that studies fIrms' motives for 
voluntary participation in programs that yield environmental and social benefIts. A fIrm must gauge 
the costs and benefIts of voluntary compliance before it makes the participation decision. A 
number of economists, including Aseem Prakash, SeemaArora and Timothy Cason and Robert 
Baylis, Lianne Connell and Andrew Flynn cite a variety of categories of costs and benefIts of 
voluntary compliance with environmental programs. The biggest potential costs could come from 
new capital equipment, employee retraining, fInancial market fluctuations and, of course, the 
opportunity costs of the funds used for development of and compliance with voluntary programs. 
Potential benefIts include savings realized from enhanced operating efficiency, goodwill from 
shareholders, consumers, and other concerned communities and preempting mandatory regulation 
and thereby getting a jump on competitors. The magnitude of potential costs and benefIts are 
primarily determined by two things: the level of the threat of mandatory regulation a company 
believes to exist and the type of voluntary program being implemented. Certain benefIts and costs 
change in size depending on these two variables. Therefore, in order to get a better handle on 
theories behind voluntary pollution mitigation and GHG abatement in particular, this paper begins 
with an explanation of the background level of regulatory threat perceived by relevant fIrms and 
then explains how emissions trading systems work and why they are the most likely candidates for 
policy tools if mandatory emissions abatement legislation is adopted in the United States. With the 
political background in place, the potential benefIts and costs of voluntary participation in pollution 
abatement programs can be discussed. Each of these topics has its own section below. 
The Threat of Legislation 
Regulation of GHGs in the name of climate ch~ge i~ a relatively new policy area, but it is 
also a fast-growing one. The Kyoto treaty requires each participating country to devise its own 
emission reductions strategies in order to reach compliance with the global abatement agreements. 
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Sixteen nations have either mandatory or voluntary GHGs reduction programs, and some, like the 
Netherlands and Canada, have more than one program in operation. In addition to these domestic 
programs, the European Union, the World Bank and North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) countries are developing their own abatement policies and programs.3 Roughly 5,000 
companies face emissions controUegislation from the Eur9pean Union (Fialka: 2002) . 
. Given the evolution of GHG emissions control policy in the past decade, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that domestic and international policy could be drivers behind many fIrms' 
decisions to voluntarily reduce emissions of GHGs. Indeed, this hypothesis is supported by 
evidence from the investment industry as well as groups that are trying to establish voluntary 
trading programs in carbon equivalent credits, like the CCX, and theoretical literature. According to 
John S. Guttmann, a commercial environmental attorney, companies that stand to be affected by 
environmental regulation, "are always on the lookout for trends that will be of importance to the 
regulated community, regulators, and the public" because those changes tend to lead to 
environmental regulation (Guttmann: 1998,82). Guttmann notes that globalization and public 
participation in the regulatory process are two recent trends pushing environmental policy. Massive 
globalized manufacturing corporations will playa critical role in international GHG abatement 
schemes, and publicly available documents like the U.S. EPA's 1990-2000 Inventory of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks empower citizens to question corporations' environmental 
policies (or lack thereof). Citizen and other stakeholders' action will be discussed toward the end 
of this chapter, but it should be noted now that people who believe themselves to be stakeholders in 
a corporation in one way or another significantly push companies to improve their environmental 
records (Foulon et. at.: 2001; Prakash: 2002; Henningsen: 2002; Knoepfel: 2001). 
Cantor Fitzgerald's satellite group dedicated to carbon trading, C02e.com, reports that 
companies are already engaging in market transactions of carbon credits, and will do so· even more 
in the future as a way to hedge their exposure to expected regulations and mandatory abatement of 
GHG emissions.4 PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides the consulting services to C02e.com's 
customers through Climate Change Strategic Services, a specialized advisory service. The Service 
provides companies with background scientific, political and regulatory analysis that helps 
customers devise strategies to rriax~ze profItability in an uncertain future business environment. 
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Climate Change Strategic Services emphasizes, "testing the business plan for climate change 
impact," and operates under the assumption that, in the future, companies will have to operate, "in a 
carbon constrained world."s According to a study by the World Bank and a New York-based 
energy and environmental consulting and trading ftnn called Natsource LLC, carbon trading is 
estimated to have quadrupled in 2002 compared to 2001. The World Bank estimates that between 
$350 and $500 million in carbon dioxide emissions trades have taken place since 1996 (Fialka: 
2002). Jack Cogen, the president of Natsource, is quoted in a Wall Street Journal article as saying, 
"'If you're a company and you're looking toward the future, you may see a large liability 
looming'" (Fialka: 2002). The liability is in reference to international and domestic (non-U.S.) 
GHG regulatory systems that are supposed to go online within the next few years. This feeling is 
echoed by Mike Walsh, senior vice president of Environmental Financial Products LLC, the ftnn 
organizing the CCX. Walsh says, "there's a one-hundred percent probability of policy [change]. 
It's a matter of when" the regulations will be imposed (Walsh: 10/24/02). The Exchange 
announced its fourteen founding members in January of 2003.6 
Even members of the petroleum industry - the industry that provides fuel to millions of 
polluting internal combustion engines around the world - believe that regulation of GHGs, 
particularly the GHGs in fossil fuels, is soon to be a fact of life. Lord John Browne, the CEO of 
BP, believe's the U.S. government will regulate GHGs in the near future in spite of President 
Bush's refusal to sign the Kyoto treaty. Moreover, Browne, like a number of other corporate 
leaders and business analysts, believes companies that pre-empt mandatory regulation by 
voluntarily mitigating harmful atmospheric impacts will not only gain competitive industry 
advantage, but will also "'gain a seat at the table, a chance to influence the rules'" (Frey: 2002). 
Kathleen Segerson and Thomas J. Miceli study the role that background regulatory threats 
play in inducing fums to participate in theoretical, generic voluntary pollution reduction programs 
in their paper, "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental 
Protection?" They look at how different theoretical scenarios for the relative bargaining powers of 
a ftnn and a regulatory body affect voluntary pollution,aQatement outcomes. Neither the type of 
pollution nor the type of voluntary program are specifted. They find that, in their model, a firm will 
always accept a voluntary agreement if the possibility of legislation is greater than zero. They also 
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find that, if the threat of regulation is high enough, the aggregate level of abatement will be higher 
under a voluntary program than it would have been if an abatement level had been imposed 
legislatively. Moreover, since compliance costs are lower under a voluntary program, a firm might 
even accept a higher level of abatement than would have been agreed upon if the program were 
mandatory. However, if the fum has all or most of the political bargaining power, then the level of 
abatement reached under a voluntary agreement will be lower than the best possible level, i.e., the 
maximum level of abatement that could have been reached voluntarily if the regulator had had the 
majority of the bargaining power. For weak regulatory threats, the voluntary agreement would be 
negotiated, but the level of abatement would not be as high as it would have been if the regulator 
had more bargaining power (Segerson & Miceli: 1998, 128). 
Segersonand Miceli also learn that, if the level of policy threat changes over time, the fum's 
incentive to enter into a voluntary agreement will change as well. This means that the maximum 
level of abatement a fum is willing to undertake will change as the probability of legislation changes 
(Segerson & Miceli: 1998, 115). Their results indicate that voluntary actions which protect the 
environment depend, among other things, on the relative level of regulatory threats, which in turn 
depends on the political bargaining powers held by private (industrial) and public interests. The 
results of their theoretical model have consequences in the public policy realm, and the empirical 
model in this paper include independent variables that proxy for the relative bargaining powers of 
private fums, the relevant regulatory body and the general public. 
Emissions Trading Programs 
Most of the policy tools that governments and international governing bodies like the 
European Union have adopted for GHG abatement are centered around permit or emission 
reduction credit (ERe) trading, in which agents are allowed to trade and bank permits to comply 
with regulation.7 Emissions trading harnesses market forces to reduce pollution in a cost-effective 
and efficient manner. Trading is considered to be more flexible than command-and-control 
environmental regulation because each fum is allowed to choose whether it reduces emissions 
internally or buys emission reduction "credits" from other firms that have reduced emissions 
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below the required level and therefore have excess credits to-either bank or sell. A rational ftrm will 
choose the least-cost method of compliance with the emissions cap. 
A successful example of such a program is Title N of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act 
Amendments, which employs a cap-and-trade system to regulate emissions of sulfur dioxide (S02) 
and nitrogen oxides (N0x). The Acid Rain Program, as Title N is known, has been deemed 
successful by legislators and economists because of the significant reductions in S02 and NOx 
emissions - 33 and 25 percent lower in 2001 than in 1990, respectively.s Even regulated utilities 
prefer the market-based system over a command.,.and-control system because costs are relatively 
low (Tietenberg: 2000; Stavins: 1995). The Kyoto Protocol employs an international permit and 
offset trading system to help countries achieve compliance at the least possible cost. The majority 
of countries participating in Kyoto that have already begun to design domestic compliance policies, 
including Australia, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom, plan on using mandatory or 
voluntary internal emissions trading systems.9 
The Potential Benefits of Voluntmy Participation 
The co~t effectiveness of trading schemes, and the high likelihood that future U.S. 
regulation will employ a cap-and-trade system like the one used in the Acid Rain Program, 
probably explains a good deal of firms' motivations for engaging in voluntary emissions trading 
and the design of carbon markets. First, firms could potentially see large savings from improved 
operating efftciency spurred by participation in a voluntary abatement program, particularly if that 
program allows for ERCs to be sold on an exchange. There are at least three specific reasons why 
a company would want to preempt future environmental regulation by voluntarily reducing harmful 
environmental impacts: the ftrm could gain competitive advantage and ftrst-mover advantage in the 
future; reductions now could be recognized under future regulation; and overseas industry pressure, 
especially among multinationals and under the Kyoto Protocol, would be diffused. The economic 
literature also gives at least four reasons for a companY' to voluntarily reduce its emissions that do 
not necessarily have to do with preempting mandatory regulation, but the results may be amplified 
by participation in a voluntary program. Three of these beneftts are related to obtaining the 
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goodwill of a company's stakeholders, and one of which is, like enhanced operating efficiency, a 
business strategy that tends to increase short- and long-term success for a variety of reasons. The 
stakeholder benefits accrue from shareholder or investment market goodwill, consumer goodwill 
and community goodwill. Each of these categories of benefits to voluntary action are outlined in 
detail in the following paragraphs. 
Improved Energy Efficiency 
Basic economic theory states that a manufacturer (or any other economic agent) should try 
to get the most output possible from a given amount of input - this is efficiency. Fuel to run the 
production process is an input, and a profit-maximizing company will consume as little energy per 
unit of good produced in its production processes as the relative costs of fossil fuels and their 
substitutes dictate - this is energy efficiency. Despite the rationale, many firms operate below 
maximum energy efficiency. Part of the problem is a lack of technical energy use expertise and the 
absence of an aggressive strategy for reducing inefficiencies within the firm. Another obstacle is 
the potentially high cost of energy-saving capital improvements. It might not make sense for a 
company to upgrade all of its operations in one fiscal year, but it would be sensible for a forward-
thinking firm to replace retired capital equipment with energy-efficient substitutes, because then the 
"upgrade" would only be the marginal cost of the more efficient equipment, if the" more efficient 
equipment is in fact more costly than other new equipment. Moreover, annual savings from 
reduced energy use could be factored into the capital purchasing decision. The benefits of 
improved energy efficiency would increase if regulation on carbon emissions were adopted - or if a 
fum were to choose to join a voluntary emissions trading program, in which the firm could either 
bank or sell accrued emission reduction credits. Every ton of carbon dioxide equivalent could be 
applied toward compliance, and additional tons kept out of the air could be sold as ERCs. Under a 
trading regime, a company can save money in its production processes and potentially generate 
income by selling its excess ERCs to fums that cannot reach compliance. 
Eventually, regulations on carbon emissions should bring the private costs of generating 
emissions in line with the public costs, as that is the general goal of legislation aimed at 
internalizing costs that are "external" to the fum. Various types of regulation, such as tax systems, 
emissions caps and command-and-control, can be used to drive companies to internalize the 
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negative social externalities of their operations (Hobbs & Centolella: 1995). Finns that are said to 
be going "beyond compliance" impose these or similar additional costs on themselves (Prakash: 
2001). If a fInn that has been forced to internalize the GHG-related social costs associated with its 
operations wishes to remain competitive, then reducing the amount of pollution produced per unit 
of output can help a company achieve compliance and reduce overall operating costs. However, it 
should be noted that a company may see a benefIt to joining an ERC trading system and registering 
its current level of emissions before improving its operating efficiency and reducing emissions. 
According to the theory of decreasing marginal returns to energy efficiency investments, the 
marginally least expensive reductions will be the initial ones, so it would be wise to tie initial 
effIciency-related abatements in with a trading program in order to receive ERCs for those relatively 
"cheap" reductions. Receiving long-term bankable permits for baseline emissions reductions 
might not be the best possible strategy for mitigating the threat of climate change, but it is a valid 
motivation for a fIrm's voluntary participation. 
Benefits Related to Potential Regulation: 
Competitive Advantage in the Future & First-mover Advantage 
It follows from the previous discussion of regulatory threat that preparation could be the 
key to business success in an uncertain future. Adjusting policies and operations in anticipation of 
regulatory shifts puts a fIrm at a competitive advantage in terms of being able to cost-effectively 
cope with new new abatement demands. Mike Walsh of the CCX and others explain that those 
fmns which already have the framework for reducing emissions in place, as well as trained staff, 
will be better positioned to navigate the new regulatory fIeld than those fIrms that operate under the 
mindset that business will always be business as usual. 
Some companies set strict environmental performance standards and policies for themselves 
as a form of business discipline. Electrolux, for example, sees the ultimate goal of "sustainability" 
as "central to its business strategy and as a source of.;;ompetitive advantage" (Henningsen: 2002, 
167). Thecommitment to sustainability sets Electrolux products apart from those of competitors, 
and forces the company to take an active, involved role in its production process, which could help 
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bring various inefficiencies to light. Similarly, BP CEO John Browne, possibly the most high-
profIle example of corporate environmental leadership, sees investment in photovoltaic (PV) 
production and the formation of symbiotic partnerships with local governments and non-
governmental organizations as investments that will serve the long-term interests of the company. 
For example, BP is a participating member of the Environmental Defense's emission permit trading 
group, among others, and has pledged $1 million to the Nature Conservancy of Canada for habitat 
conservation. lO Browne sees increased demand for PV power in the future as energy markets are 
deregulated, as energy provision becomes privatized, and as the U.S. government provides 
additional incentives for consumers to use renewable power. Moreover, he thinks that subsidies 
will someday be removed from fossil fuels (Lowe & Harris: 1998). Oil, natural gas and coal 
companies are given billions of dollars annually in tax write-offs for exploration, developing and 
drilling costs, and taxpayer funding for "clean coal" research and Export Import Bank guarantees 
on investments in "unstable" countries.11 Being prepared for changes in the political realm, he and 
other business leaders reason, will serve the long-term competitive interests of the company. 
Anticipating more stringent regulation could yield even greater returns if a company is 
among the first in its industry to bring its operations in line with the expectations of future policies. 
Aseem Prakash, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington in Seattle, 
writes that there are two main reasons why pre-empting regulation would prove beneficial: it could 
raise the cost of entry into the industry and put first-movers in a position to shape official public 
policy (Prakash: 2002). According to some researchers, technologically advanced firms would be 
the most likely to adopt green practices anyway, since they already have the infrastructure for 
compliance in place. These firms could take further advantage of their position by pressuring the 
rest of the industry to reduce environmental impacts, or by lobbying government to pass legislation 
that would make certain "best available control" technologies - technologies monopolized by these 
research-intensive firms -mandatory (Prakash: 2002). Firms that take leadership roles in their 
respective industries are in a position to determine the course and nature of regulation; this goes for 
firms that lead in the realm of environmental responsibility as well. Mike Walsh believes that the 
government will soon begin to look for ways to regulate GHG emissions, and that the CCX will be 
an obvious resource, since the Exchange will have already tested a domestic ERC trading system. 
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Walsh suggests that this potential for shaping public policy is part of a finn's motivation in joining 
the design phase of the CCX (Walsh: 10/24/02). 
Recognition Under Future Regulations 
The benefits of engaging in voluntary pollution abatement would be reduced if present 
actions, and documented emissions reductions, were not going to be recognized under the expected 
future regulatory regime. The people at the cutting edge of the emissions trading market are 
confident, though, that documented emissions reductions will get credit for early action under future 
policy (Walsh: 10/24/02; C02e.com; CCX PowerPoint). Moreover, as was previously explained, it 
is highly likely that future GHG legislation will take the form of a cap-and-trade system. The 
aforementioned energy efficiency improvements are most beneficial to a company if the reductions 
are recorded in a legitimate registry of some sort. 
Overseas Industry Pressure 
One of the arguments used by representatives from the United States in refusing to sign the 
Kyoto standards into domestic law is that the international treaty would put American companies at 
a competitive disadvantage with the rest of the world. The argument states that the goods produced 
by U.S. firms would have to be priced higher than goods produced abroad if U.S. firms face tighter 
regulations on environmental health and safety, wages, etc. than foreign firms, and that U.S. goods 
would therefore be priced out of the market. International trade treaties take into account the 
uniformity of manufacturing environmental and workers' rights standards in some cases, and 
ignore it in others. Now, with the Kyoto Protocol set to go into effect in the very near future, 
American companies will face a different and less environmentally stringent set of regulations from 
those in most other parts of the developed (and some of the developing) world. 12 Multinational 
companies will be subject to local domestic GHG regulations, and it could be in their best interests 
to employ some sort of internal emissions trading program like the one used by BP in order to 
meet the domestic abatement standards. 13 If a company~s lE.S. operations are not included within 
the Kyoto framework, however, internal abatements that involve U.S. facilities cannot be recognized, 
and overall abatement might therefore be less cost-effective. Mike Walsh says there will probably 
13 
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be international, intracompany trading with the CCX, which could be another reason for U.S.-based 
companies to sign on (Walsh: 10/24/02). It could be in the best interests of an international firm to 
have a compliance strategy that is as flexible as possible, which might include emissions trading. 
Voluntary participation iIi a trading system now would prepare a fIrm's staff to deal with a 
mandatory System that might come along in the future or, in the case of Kyoto, within months. 
Benefits Unrelated to Potential Regulation 
Status As an Industry Leader 
Corporate leadership, from the CEO, CPO or other top-level managers, is often cited as a 
major driver in a fIrm's decision to reduce its GHG emissions by business leaders and academic 
papers alike (Frey: 2002; Baylis et. al.: 1998). Howard Ris, President of the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, says that "90 percent" of a fIrm's decision to engage in voluntary environmental 
protection programs, particularly ones pertaining to GHG emissions and climate change, is 
determined by the goals or mindset of the CEO (Ris: 12/5/02). Corporate environmental leadership 
has become almost popular among some large businesses in the past decade. For example, 
Interface, one of the world's biggest carpet manufacturers, has the ultimate sustainable goals of 
zero waste and closed-loop production, goals put in place by its corporate leadership (Henningsen: 
2002). Deutsche Bank has been involved in the United Nations Environmental Program, the 
Bellagio Forum for Sustainable Development and the World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund. A 
spokesman for the bank's Board of Managing Directors, Rolf-E Breuer, is quoted as saying, 
"'sustainability it not an abstract idea .. .it is an important element of[our] corporate policy and a 
signifIcant factor driving [our] business policy decisions'" (Henningsen: 2002, 167). 
Once again, oil companies like BP and Shell are jumping on the bandwagon, too. John 
Browne of BP calls ducking out of responsibility toward the environment, "a failure of leadership" 
(Frey: 2002). In 1998, Browne committed his company, with current gross revenues of $174 
billion, to carbon emission reductions of 10 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2010, a 
commitment more ambitious than the Kyoto Protocol. His company achieved the goal in 2001, 
nine years ahead of schedule (Frey: 2002; BP: 2002). The company met its internal standards 
quickly - and at no net cost to business - by engaging in intracompany emissions trading, that is, 
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trading ERCs among BP business units around the world (BP: 2002; Frey: 2002).14 The issue is 
both a civic and a business one for Browne, who told the New York Times Magazine, "Climate 
change is an issue which raises fundamental questions about the relationship between companies 
and society as a whole, and between one generation and the next" (Frey: 2002). He also makes the 
case that what is good for the climate is also good for business, particularly if the regulation he 
expects comes to fruition. Browne operates with the outlook that fossil fuels will probably be 
phased out in 30 to 50 years, but that regulation of GHG emissions will come much sooner than 
that (Frey: 2002; Lowe & Harris: 1998). Today, BP is working with the Pew Center for Global 
Climate Change, C02e.com and the lETA to design ERC trading programs. 
Shareholder/ Investment Market Goodwill 
Company shareholders and other investment market agents can put significant pressure on 
firms to change their environmental and social actions for the better. A large portion of the 
literature states that investors can be active in the greening of a company, either through direct 
shareholder resolution or through the initial decision to invest (Prakash: 2002; Henningsen: 2002; 
Knoepfel: 2001; Guttmann: 1998). A direct shareholder resolution forced ExxonMobil to divest 
from the Global Climate Coalition, a lobbying group aimed at delegitimizing climate change 
(Gelbspan: 2002). More recently, in early December of 2002, a religious group called the Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibilities filed shareholder resolutions with Ford and General Motors, 
asking the auto manufacturers to reduce GHG emissions in both its manufacturing plants and its 
products - cars, trucks and SUVs (ENS: 2002). It is as of yet unclear what effect the resolution has 
had on the fmns' management and operations. 
Sometimes investment decisions are based on social and environmental quality indicators 
not necessarily because the investor cares about workers or the climate, but rather because she 
wants to make the most possible money off of her investments. According to Ivo Knoepfel, Head 
of Rating and Index Research at SAMS Sustainability Group and a co-chair of the Global 
Reporting Initiative's Measurement Working Group, "inqe~singly, investors use corporate 
sustainability as a proxy for enlightened and disciplined management" (Knoepfel: 2001). This 
concept ties in with the notion of corporate leadership discussed above. Certain CEOs echo this 
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theory, such as Harry Kraemer, Jr., of Baxter International. Kraemer believes that, "'sustainable 
development provides a framework to create opportunities out of these winds of change,'" and that 
such changes improve the bottom line and, therefore, dividends (Henningsen: 2002, 167). It is 
becoming widely accepted in the investment industry that environmental and social screens "add 
value to the screening process" by providing evidence of strong, innovative and aggressive 
leadership (Henningsen: 2002, 165; Knoepfel: 2001). According to the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Group Index (DJSGI), companies listed on the DJSGI had better average returns on equity, 
investments and assets than companies in the regular Dow Jones Global Index (DJGl) from 1993 
to August of 2000 (Knoepfel: 2001,7). 
Economists Jerome Foulon, Paul Lanoie and Benoit Laplante cite three studies which have 
shown that publicly disclosed information drives increases in market share value when the 
disclosure is of superior performance, and drives share prices downward when the disclosure is 
negative (Foulon et. al.: 2001, 170). The number of invested dollars illustrates the degree to which 
shareholders value corporate responsibility indicators, for one reason or another. Over $2 trillion 
are in socially responsible investments under professional management in the United States. 
According to Carsten Henningsen of Progressive Investment Management, total U.S. assets in 
social investments grew 36 percent from 1999 to 2001, over 1.5 times the 22 percent overall 
increase for all investment assets managed professionally in the same period (Henningsen: 2002). 
Consumer Goodwill 
Surveys and empirical studies report that consumers look for "green" labels on products 
and are willing to pay more for such environmentally friendly goods and services (Prakash: 2002; 
Arora & Cason: 1995; Arora & Gangopadhyay: 1995). Generally, companies that sell goods 
directly to final consumers focus their advertising on brands and specific products, and are the most 
likely to claim to be environmentally responsible (Prakash: 2002; Arora & Cason: 1995; Arora & 
Gangopadhyay: 1995). A 1999 survey found that 50 percent of Americans claim to look for green 
labels on the products they buy, and to switch brands based on their the firm's environmental 
record. Not all of these people may be willing to pay the premium price that is often charged for 
greener products (Prakash: 2002), but eConomists Seema Arora and Shubhashis Gangopadhyay 
report that consumer markets are segmented, and that people who value environmental benefits and 
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can afford them can support a market for "green" products (Arora & Gangopadhyay: 1995). 
Arora and Gangopadhyay construct a two-stage game theoretical model in which ftrms decide on 
the level of environmental cleanliness! control they will employ, and then compete in prices. They 
fmd that, by setting different levels of environmental protection, the ftrms differentiate themselves 
and are able to cater to a segmented market in which some consumers are willing to pay more than 
others for additional environmental beneftts. Aseem Prakash, however, examines consumer surveys 
and fmds that, according to a 1991 survey, 47 percent of consumers think that corporate 
environmental claims are "gimmicks" (Prakash: 2002). Mandatory public reporting of pollution 
enables consumers to see the differences between the environmental policies of the different ftrms, 
if consumers choose to look up the information (Arora & Gangopadhyay: 1995; Prakash: 2002). 
Mandatory public reporting of pollution and other environmental impacts, or public 
disclosure, has been found to be a driver of consumer and investor decision-making. A number of 
researchers conclude that public disclosure of environmental performance creates strong incentives 
for a ftrm to engage in pollution control (poulon et at.: 2001; Arora & Cason: 1995; Arora & 
Gangopadhyay: 1995; Guttmann: 1998). Public disclosure and the impact of community "right-
to-know" laws on ftrm environmental performance are discussed in the following section. 
Community GoodwilV Right-to-Know 
Community goodwill is perhaps the broadest category of goodwill because the actors are 
not as clearly defmed as they are in the shareholder and consumer goodwill categories. In fact, 
shareholders and consumers can be considered part of the greater community that comes into 
contact with a given ftrm, its products and its pollution. According to John Guttmann, 
environmental organizations and community members see themselves as "stakeholders" in the 
polluters' operations, and feel they have a rightto know about environmental infractions and a right 
to be involved in the regulatory process (Guttmann: 1998,85). 
Paul Wapner writes about grassroots community activism in his essay, "Politics Beyond 
the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics," and concludes that transnational 
environmental activist groups like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund politicize societies, or 
motivate citizens, by bringing "hidden" or unknown environmental abuses to the surface (Wapner: 
1998,515). This politicization yields signiftcant positive results in many cases. Motivated citizens 
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are often rallied into a boycott of a certain offending product or company (non-dolphin-safe tuna 
and McDonald's styrofoam hamburger containers are two classic examples), and the community/ 
consumer! citizen groups are often successful in bringing about changes in corporate policies, at 
least at the visible level. Greenpeace, for example, is currently organizing boycotts of ExxonMobil 
gas stations because of ExxonMobil's refusal to address climate change. A Business Week article 
on environmental activism by Laura Cohn and Heather Timmons notes that a Deutsche Bank report 
on ExxonMobil states, '''Being handed a reputation as environmental enemy No.1 for such a big 
customer-facing business has to be considered a brand risk'" (Cohn & Timmons: 2002). The 
same article quotes Phil Capp, the President of a Washington, DC-based lobbying group, as saying, 
"'Companies are very sensitive to anything that would put their brand name in a bad light,' (Cohn 
& Timmons: 2002). It is evident from these and other anecdotes, as well as empirical tests, that 
activist groups can put pressure on corporations by mobilizing communities. 
Citizens do not just rely on Greenpeace to inform them of environmental damages in their 
neighborhoods, though. Community right-to-know sources like the U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory and the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a mandatory self-reporting system for over 320 
chemicals that was established in 1988 to track release and transport of toxic materials, are relatively 
accessible public databases that list the toxic releases and transfers, GHG emissions and other 
environmental damages of individual companies and/or operating facilities. Both Mike Walsh of 
the CCX and attorney/ author John Guttmann believe that expansions of these and other right-to-
know laws, and the attendant direct public involvement in the oversight of both large and small 
corporations, are becoming regulatory drivers (Walsh: 10/24/02; Guttmann: 1998). Foulon et. al. 
conducts an empirical analysis of the relative impact of "traditional enforcement" and information 
strategies (public disclosure) in pollution control undertaken by a ftrm, and conclude that, 
" ... evidence that the public disclosure of environmental performance does create additional and 
strong incentives for pollution control" (Foulon et al.: 2001, 169). The researchers also find 
evidence that appearing on a public list of polluters has a stronger impact on firm behavioral 
changes than do monetary fines (Foulon et al.: 2001; 185). 
Robert Baylis, Lianne Connell and Andrew Flynn look at the relationship that company size 
and existing regulations have on a f1l1Ii's perceptions of the stimuli that drive them to improve their 
environmental records, an~ come to a similar result in their paper, "Company Size, Environmental 
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Regulation and Ecological Modernization: Further Analysis at the Level of the Firm." They 
conclude that social responsibility is a significant driving factor in a firm's decision to improve its 
environmental record (more so among large companies than among small-ta-medium enterprises), 
and that local communities can influence industry (Baylis et. al.: 1998). With the amount of media 
attention that climate change, ratification of the Kyoto treaty and domestic non-involvement in the 
entire global political process have received in recent months, it would not be surprising to learn that 
citizens are beginning to take into account the climatic impacts of the companies they typically 
patronize, much like Greenpeace has done with ExxonMobil. 
These are significant findings, because they indicate that community activism can influence 
company behavior as much as ..; or even more than - government-sanctioned regulation. Expansion 
of community right-to-know programs could drive companies to "voluntarily" mitigate their 
negative environmental impacts. Not every community is made up of empowered and vocal 
citizens, though, as a 1996 study by Seema Arora and Timothy Cason illustrates, entitled, "Do 
Community Characteristics Determine Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxic Release 
Inventory." Arora and Cason look at toxic releases from the TRI database, voter turnout and 
socioeconomic, gender and racial factors to test the significance of each of these on the 
environmental performance of polluters in thousands of designated geographic regions around the 
United States. Overall, they find that the variables presumed to affect the likelihood that 
communities will engage in political action, including voting, significantly increase environmental 
performance. These variables include higher education, catpooling to work, having kids, 
employment in manufacturing industries, median age and percentage of residents renting their 
primary residences (Arora & Cason: 1996). They also conclude that economic variables 
significantly impact toxic releases: poorer neighborhoods have higher rates of toxic releases, and 
very wealthy neighborhoods have the least (Arora & Cason: 1996).15 These results are important 
because they indicate that there could be geographic or demographic aspects to firms' 
environmental performance. It also means that "policy threats" could include civil action as well 
as government mandate, and variables contributing to an~tive citizenry should therefore be 
incorporated into any empirical study of voluntary participation in environmental programs. 
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Chapter Two 
The 33/50 Program and A Firm-Level Model of Participation 
The 33/50 Program is a voluntary chemical pollution prevention program that was initiated 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1991.16 The Program had the goals of 
reducing the releases and transfers of 17 highly toxic chemicals by 33 percent by the end of 1992 
and by 50 percent by the end of 1995. It was a temporary pilot program that only ran from 1991 to 
1995, and is therefore not in operation today. Unlike many EPA programs, the focus of the 33/50 
Pr~gram was on prevention rather than containment or other "end-of-pipe" pollution remedies. 
The EPA offered the opportunity to participate to 555 companies that had "substantial chemical 
releases" in February of 1991, and to 5,000 more companies in July of 1991. Over the next three 
years, 2,500 more invitations were offered to selected facilities (U.S. EPA: 1999). According to the 
EPA, almost 1,300 companies joined the 33/50 Program. The EPA dedicated most of its outreach 
to the 600 companies with the largest volumes of releases and transfers, and participation among 
these companies was 64 percent, versus under 14 percent for the smaller fInns. According to the 
EPA, 1,066 of the 1,294 participants set measurable reduction goals that represented almost a 
halving of these fIrms' 1988 releases and transfers (1988 was the baseline year).11 
There have been a few economic analyses of the 33/50 Program, which has been dubbed 
successful in achieving its chemical release and transport reduction goals in a timely and cost-
effective manner. One such study, a paper by economists Seema Arora and Anthony Cason 
entitled, "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 
Program," thoroughly examines the fIrm-level characteristics that affect the probability with which 
a fIrm will join the Program. Their theory is based upon the notion that, if a fIrm's expected profIt 
with participation in the Program (EIIi,p) is greater than the fIrm's expected profIt without 
participation (EIIi,N), then the profIt-maximizing fIrm will join the Program. Arora and Cason use 
a dummy variable Di to denote fIrm i's participation decision: Di will be equal to one if expected 
profIts are greater with participation, and zero if expected profIts are lower with participation. This 
is illustrated by the following expression: 18 
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Arora and Cason use a bivariate probit model to detennine the likelihood with which a given 
polluter will voluntarily join the Program. Their righthand side variables are all factors presumed to 
affect firms' expected profits. 
Arora and Cason assume that, first and foremost, differences in technologies and 
production processes across industries will change the benefits and costs of participation in the 
33/50 Program or, in fact, any other voluntary program. Cleaner production technologies may not 
be available for certain industries, and the existence and character of manufacturers' associations 
may influence any individual firm's decision to participate. The amount of money any given 
industry tends to spend on research and development might affect participation rates within that 
industry, mostly because of the theory that technologically advanced finns are best positioned to 
profit from Program participation. The authors also mention that a firm's proximity to consumers 
will affect the decision to participate. These last two theories were discussed in Chapter One of this 
paper. Arora and Cason hypothesize that the market structure of a given industry will also affect 
participation: firms in more competitive industries would have greater incentive to differentiate their 
products than firms in less competitive industries, but firms in competitive industries would also 
have a more difficult time passing additional costs on to consumers. The authors expect 
participation rates to be lower in more competitive industries. They suggest that firms that use the 
greatest number of Program chemicals will have the most opportunities for mitigation, and will 
therefore have higher participation rates than firms which use fewer of the 17 Program chemicals. 
They do note, however, that firms with the largest ratios of chemical use to sales would, 
theoretically, have lower probability rates than firms for which the chemicals are not as intrinsic to 
the production process. Finally, they hypothesize that firms which are more profitable and healthier 
financially will be the most likely to participate in the Program, since these firms will not have the 
.. ~ . """' .. " .' 
short-term tunnel vision of financially strapped companies (Arora & Cason: 1995). 
Arora and Cason use EPA data from the 33/50 Program and the Toxic Release lriventory 
(TRI) to provide environmental data and to examine the chemical use of the seven industries with 
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the largest releases and transfers of the 17 chemicals covered under the Program. The seven 
industries are: chemicals (SIC 28), petroleum refining (SIC 29), rubber and plastics (SIC 30), 
primary metals (SIC 33), fabricated metals (SIC 34), electrical equipment (SIC 36) and 
transportation (SIC 37). The researchers use two other main sources of data: the EPA's Human 
Health and Ecotoxicity database (HHED), which is used to assign toxicities to the 17 different 
chemicals, and Standard & Poor's Compustat database, which supplies financial data on individual 
firms. The financial data they use is from 1990, the year before the Program began. Only 302 
large, publicly traded firms "survived" the merging of the 33/50 Program, TRI and Compustat 
databases. They use a bivariate probit model, with the yes/no decision to participate in the Program 
as of February 1992, as given by the Di dummy variable, being the lefthand side variable. Table I 
provides a list of the righthand side variables they used, each variable's symbol, the estimated sign 
and the significance given by Arora and Cason's model. 
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TABLE I: Arora and Cason's Finn-Level Model- Variables and Results 
Variable Proxy Symbol Estimated Sign Significance 
(!es/no) 
Employment Finn Size EMPLT positive yes 
5-Year Average A finn's profitability PROFIT positive yes 
Return on Assets 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio A finn's financial DTARATIO negative no 
structure and debt 
obligations 
Herfindahl Index of Industry HERF negative yes 
Industry concentration! 
Concentration competitiveness 
Advertising Intensity The proximity of a ADINT negative no 
finn's products to the 
consumer 
Research & Technological ability RDINT positive no 
Development ofa finn to 
Intensity participate in the 
Program 
Total Releases, Aggregate toxicity WIREL positive yes 
Weighted by Toxicity level of the chemicals 
used by a finn; 
captures potential 
gains from Program 
participation 
Intensity of Chemical Importance of RELINT negative no 
Use Program chemicals to 
a finn's production; 
Ability of a finn to 
participate in the 
Program 
Number of Categories Captures potential NOCAT positive yes 
of Program gains from Program 
Chemicals Used participation 
~- -~ .-~ ." ;: 
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Arora and Cason's results imply that there are several firm- and industry-level 
characteristics that affect the likelihood that an individual company will participate in the 33/50 
Program. Their model does not, however, address how the costs and benefits of participation might 
be ·affected by threats of mandatory regulation. The authors state that the paper's purpose is to, 
"assess the potential ability of voluntary programs to augment more contentious command and 
control regulation," but they do not measure the effect(s) that the threat of such regulation might 
have on aftrm's decision to participate. By omitting variables relating to legislative threats, Arora 
and Cason may have left out several significant categories of benefits and costs of Program 
participation - namely, future competitive advantage, first-mover advantage, recognition under future 
regulation and overseas industry pressure. The empirical model that appears in Chapter Three is 
an attempt to remedy their omissions and measure the effects that governmental and other public 
bargaining powers may have on a fmn's weighing of the costs and benefits of Program 
participation and, therefore, the firm's participation decision. 
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Introduction 
Chapter Three 
The Empirical Model 
The empirical portion of this paper uses an ordinary least squares regression to test 11 
variables for their potential effects on state-level participation in the 33/50 Program. The dependent 
variable is the cumulative participation rate of the facilities invited to join the Program in each state, 
and is denoted PRs. Participation is measured as the number of facilities in each state that 
participated in the Program over the number of facilities that the EPA invited to join, and is the 
program-end, cumulative participation rate. The lowest participation rate (13.3 percent) belongs to 
Rhode Island, and the highest participation rate (51.9 percent) belongs to Delaware. The mean 
participation rate (31.3 percent) is closest to that of Connecticut (31.4 percent), Arizona (31.1 
percent), Arkansas (31.5 percent), Florida (30.8 percent) and Alabama (30.5 percent). The standard 
deviation of the participation rates is roughly .068814; the complete table of descriptive statistics 
appears in Table II on page 33. This five-state sampling, and the states with the minimum and 
maximum participation rates, suggest no pattern of participation that is strictly geographical. Data 
used to compute the participation rates come from "33/50 Program: The Final Record," a 
summary document published by the EPA in March of 1999. 
The right-hand side variables represent 11 aggregate political and economic characteristics 
of the 48 continental states; the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii, while they had facilities 
participating in the Program, have to be excluded from the regression analysis because of missing 
data. The first five variables in the model below, ASNCs, AVRs, LCVs, SCMs and PDUMs, are all 
proxied indicators of the level of "public bargaining power" that is present in a state, as Kathleen 
Segerson and Thomas 1. Miceli would put it. The next two variables, PMEs and PSICs, proxy the 
level of political bargaining power held by manufacturing industries within a state, i.e., the political 
clout or bargaining power of the industries most susceptible to regulation of toxic chemical use. 
The remaining variables, IMECs, SIZEs, URs and CEVSs:"measure relative economic characteristics 
of the states and, in particular, manufacturing industries. The subsequent paragraphs define each 
variable and proceed to explain how the data for each were gathered and what, if any, manipulations 
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were done. The results of the regression and tests are in Chapter Four. 
The Model: 
PR s = {3o+ {31ASNCs+ {32AVRs+ {33LCVs+ {34SCMs+ {35PDUMs+ {36PMEs+ {37PSICs+ 
{38IMECs+ {39SIZEs+ {3lOURs+ {31 lCEVSs+ & 
Where PDUMs is a dummy variable such that: 
PDUMs = {
1 if the plurality of survey respondents identifies with the Democratic party } 
o if the plurality of survey respondents does not identify with the Democratic party 
s = state in the continental United States 
Descriptions of the Variables 
The variable ASNCs is a proxy for the threat of enforcement of hazardous waste regulations 
in each state for the years 1991 - 1995. The variable represents the number of Addressed 
Significant Non-Compliances (SNCs) of three EPA hazardous waste regulations: the Emergency 
Protection and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).19 "Addressed SNCs" is a 
percentage of the number of SNCs addressed by the EPA in a state over the total number of SNCs 
reported in that state for the three EPA programs. The EPCRA, RCRA and TSCA programs 
regulate the reporting of toxic chemical use, the disposal of solid and hazardous wastes and the use 
of certain chemicals and other controlled substanc.e.~."respectively.20 These programs are all similar 
to the 33/50 Program in that they govern the use and disposal of toxic chemicals and hazardous 
wastes, and the 33/50 Program was designed to reduce the releases and transfers of these same 
chemicals. The EPA enforcement database used to compute these data gives the total number of 
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SNCs, the number of addressed SNCs, and the percentage of addressed/total SNCs for each year 
in which there were SNCs for each of the three programs. The variable ASNCs closely proxies the 
level of mandatory toxic use and release regulatory threat that the facilities invited to join the 33/50 
Program would have felt when making their participation decisions. The numbers used in the 
empirical model are the total average percentages of addressed SNCs over the period 1991 - 1995. 
It is expected that the coefficient on ASNCs will be positive, since fIrms would feel a stronger threat 
of mandatory regulation if the EPA in a given state operates in a thorough and strict manner when 
dealing with noncompliance. A regulatory body would be seen as less threatening, and less likely 
to enforce new mandatory legislation, if it cannot even address violations of existing laws. 
Descriptive statistics for ASNCs are in Table II. 
The variable A VRs is a proxy for the political participation rates and overall political! civic 
engagement of the voting-age population of each state. This proxy is the average presidential 
voting rate in each state, calculated as the average of the voting rates in the 1988, 1992 and 1996 
presidential elections.21 It is hard to predict the sign that the coefficient on A VRs might have, 
because the political awareness of registered voters could have either a positive or negative effect on 
the level of threat of impending regulation felt by a fIrm. Depending on the interests of voters, high 
. values for A VRs could signal bargaining power on the (publiC) side of the regulatory body or on the 
side of the manufacturing industry. If voters are extremely concerned with environmental issues, 
then high values of A VRs should increase the bargaining power of the public regulatory body, 
thereby increasing the threat of legislation and prompting more fIrms to join the 33/50 Program. 
On the other hand, if there is little concern for environmental issues, and particularly if a signifIcant 
portion of the state's economy and, therefore, political interests, is made up of manufacturing, then 
the coefficient on A VRs would probably be negative, since fIrms would feel less pressure from local 
communities to reduce chemical use. The effect of voting rates on the model will, therefore, 
probably be mixed. Descriptive statistics for A VRs appear in Table II. 
The level of awareness and attentiveness that a state's Congressional delegation has toward 
environmental issues, and, to a lesser degree, the way in which Members of the U.S. House and 
Senate perceive the concerns of their constituents, is proxied by the LCVs variable. These values 
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are the pro-environmental health and safety voting ratings given to each member of Congress by the 
League of Conservation Voters (LCV), an environmental watchdog and lobbying group based in 
Washington, D.C., for the years 1989 through 1995. Each year the LCV determines which 
legislative bills are pro-environment and which bills are anti-environment, and then tallies how each 
Member of Congress voted on those bills. The higher the LCV rating, expressed as a percent, the 
more pro-environment the representative or senator.22 The data that enter into the regression are the 
aggregate, average scores for each state's delegation between 1989 and 1998. The scores, given as 
a percentage, for each state's Senators and Representatives were added together for each of the 
years 1989 through 1995 and divided by two to get an overall score for the state for each year. In 
essence, the LCVs variable is another proxy for the state-level threat of environmental regulation 
and! or stringency, manifested in the decisions made by elected officials. The sign on the 
coefficient of LCVs is expected to be positive: the fIrms invited to participate in the 33/50 Program 
might have felt higher levels of regulatory threat in states where the elected national representatives 
were pro-environment than in states where the elected representatives voted against the interests of 
environmental health and safety. According to the theories used to form this model, this perceived 
higher likelihood of impending anti-pollution legislation should raise the benefIts of participation to 
the fIrm, and therefore increase~e voluntary participation rate. pescriptive statistics for LCVs 
appear in Table ll. 
Another variable that proxies citizens' bargaining power in environmental regulatory 
decision making is SCMs, annual Sierra Club membership measured as the number of Sierra Club 
Members in a state in each year 1990 -1995, divided by the total population of that state in each 
year. Sierra Club membership information was provided by the Sierra Club, and state population 
data were obtained from population forecasts conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.23 Whereas 
the average voting rate is only a proxy for citizens' political and social engagement, membership in 
the Sierra Club, one of the nation's fIrst environmental interest groups, indicates proactive political 
engagement and, more specifIcally, concern with enyironmental issues. It was explained in Chapter 
One of this paper that stakeholders' environmental concerns can have signifIcant effects on a 
fIrm's decision to participate in a voluntary environmental program, particularly if the fIrm's 
emissions are publicized, as they are for most of the finris invited to join the EPA's 33/50 Program. 
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Therefore, it is expected that the more Sierra Club members there are as a percentage of total state 
population, the higher the environmental community's bargaining power will be and, therefore, the 
higher Program participation rates will be. The sign on the coefficient of SCMs is expected to be 
positive. Descriptive statistics for SCMs appear in Table II. 
The only qualitative dummy variable in this model is PDUMs, which gives a rough picture 
of the state's political leanings. The variable PDUMs is entered into the equation as a one if the 
plurality of a state's residents. consider themselves Democrats (as opposed to Republicans or 
Independents).24 The LCV annual Scorecard rates Members of the U.S. Congress on 
environmental issues, with the higher scores going to those Members who cast the most votes in 
favor of environmental health and safety. The Scorecards produced immediately prior to and 
during the duration of the 33/50 Program, as well as every Scorecard since then, give Democratic 
Members much higher ratings than Republican Members.2S The sign on the coefficient of PDUMs 
is expected to be positive, since firms in Democratic-leaning states should, theoretically, feel 
pressure to have better environmental records, assuming those Democrats support environmental 
initiatives with the same consistency as do the men and women they elect to Congress. 
The percentag~ of each state's total-employment that is made up by employment in 
manufacturing is contained in the variable PMEs. This variable proxies the economic importance of 
manufacturing to the residents of the state, and, therefore, part of the bargaining power of 
manufacturing industries. Polluting industries that make up a significant portion of a state's 
economy and wage base should, theoretically, have a proportionate say in the decisions affecting 
their businesses. If state manufacturing industries do not want environmental regulation, then a 
large value for PMEs will suppress participation in the 33/50 Program and, presumably, other 
environmental health and safety programs. On the other hand, a progressive state, or a state with 
manufacturing companies that see profit in clean production, might actually [md that a big 
manufacturing sector will promote participation in environmental programs. In other words, the 
.. ~, - .' ~' -'" 
sign that this variable is expected to have is uncertain, but it is most likely to be negative. The 
PMEs values are the product of employment in manufacturing over total employment for each state, 
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as given by the 1990 Census.26 Descriptive statistics for PMEs appear in Table II. 
The 33/50 Program concentrated much of its recruiting energy on the 600 companies with 
the most releases and transfers of the relevant chemicals; these were the flrst companies asked to 
join the Program.27 Arora and Cason look at data from companies with SIC codes from the 
industries that have, according to their 1995 paper, the largest releases and transfers of 33/50 
chemicals.28 Those industries are: chemicals (SIC 28), petroleum refining (SIC 29), rubber and 
plastics (SIC 30), primary metals (SIC 33), fabricated metals (SIC 34), electrical equipment (SIC 
36) and transportation (SIC 37). Since both very dirty and very clean industries fall under the 
general category of manufacturing, including an estimate of the relative "dirtiness" of the 
manufacturing sector in each state should be a proxy for the anti-regulation industrial lobbying 
power. To estimate the composition of a state's manufacturing industry, the variable PSICs is 
included in this model. PSICs gives the percentage of manufacturing facilities within each state that 
have one of the seven SIC codes listed above. The values are calculated with data from the 1995 
Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) Geographic Area Statistics report, and represent the 
number of facilities within industries with SIC codes of 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36 and 37 in each state 
divided by the total number of manufacturing facilities in each state, averaged over the years 1989 -
1995.29 In terms of bargaining power, there is strength in numbers, and so the greater the 
percentage of a state's manufacturing industry that is made up of these seven dirty industries, the 
more bargaining power these industries could have in preventing the imposition of mandatory 
pollution control legislation. Recall that, according to the hypothesis, the higher the industrial 
bargaining power is relative to that of the regulator, the lower flrms will perceive the potential 
benefits of voluntary participation to be. On the other hand, a large group of heavy polluters might 
make companies in a state with a high value for PSICs targets for citizen and environmental activist 
groups; this would tilt bargaining power in favor of the public. To complicate things further, 
though, a state with a high value for PSICs suggests relatively high employment in these industries: 
and the (voting) public in such a state might therefore "lIbt consider environmental health and safety 
to be top concerns when compared to their livelihoods, if that is how they see the matter. If this is 
the case, then political bargaining power swings back to industry. Overall, given the mix of 
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possible influences that dirty industries might have on the balance of regulatory/ industrial 
bargaining power within a state, the sign on the coefficient of the PSICs variable is still expected to 
be negative, since it is a proxy for the bargaining power of industry. Descriptive statistics for 
PSICs appear in Table n. 
The IMECs variable gives values for the change in the index of state manufacturing 
employment between 1989 and 1995, and indicates the growth of manufacturing employment in a 
state over the course of the Program. The data used for this variable come from the 1995 ASM 
Geographic Area Statistics report, which uses 1987 as the baseline year and enters numbers less 
than 100 to indicate a drop in manufacturing employment compared with the baseline year, and 
number over 100 to indicate a rise in manufacturing employment in each year. The index numbers 
for each year 1989 through 1995 are averaged to get an overall number that indicates whether 
manufacturing employment rose or fell during the course of the 33/50 Program. The mean index 
number for 199 observations is about 104, and the median is 103, signaling an overall increase in 
manufacturing during the years the Program was in operation. The other descriptive statistics for 
IMEC s can be seen in Table II. The effect of manufacturing growth over the course of the program 
could have both negative and positive effects on the program. First, a growing manufacturing 
sector could give existing manufacturing fIrms, i.e., the ones that were asked to join the 33/50 
Program, more bargaining power versus the public regulatory body and, therefore, less of an 
incentive to join the voluntary Program. Moreover, a growing manufacturing sector could, but does 
not necessarily, suggest that a state with a high value for IMECs has relatively lax enforcement of 
environmental policies, or offers other incentives to attract manufacturers. There is the possibility, 
though, that new manufacturing facilities would operate "cleaner" than existing manufacturing 
facilities, because the capital equipment will be new for those fInns. If this is in fact the case, and 
the IMECs value is greater than 100, i.e., the manufacturing sector is growing, then older and dirtier 
facilities might feel local industry pressure to voluntarily reduce chemical releases and join the the 
33/50 Program. Overall, though, the coefficient on the IMECs variable is expected to be negative, 
since the theory of increased bargaining power for companies within a growing industry or sector 
seems as though it would have a greater impact on participation rates than the less direct internal 
"shaming" theory of industry. 
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Much of the theoretical literature suggests that larger firms are more likely than smaller 
ones to engage in voluntary environmental protection. SeemaArora and Timothy Cason's 
empirical study of 33/50 Program participation concludes that finn size has a positive and 
significant impact on participation, i.e., larger firms were significantly more likely to join the 
Program (Arora & Cason: 1995). Robert Baylis, Lianne Connell and Andrew Flynn write in their 
article, "Company Size, Environmental Regulation and Ecological Modernization: Further Analysis 
at the Level of the Firm," that, "the opportunities and abilities to manage environmental impacts 
better are likely to be skewed towards larger flrms" (Baylis et. al.: 1998,286). Of the companies 
these researchers survey, 63 percent of the large companies have environmental policies, while only 
17 percent of small-to-medium companies surveyed have environmental policies. In the paper 
written by Baylis et. al. and in others, company size is linked to other motivations for participation, 
such as increased public visibility for larger frnns, for example. Particularly in the case where a 
facility publicly reports pollution, larger frnns with larger volumes of chemical releases tend to be 
targeted by stakeholders for improved environmental policies and practices, and may also be the 
best equipped to eliminate significant amounts of pollution from their processes (Baylis et. al.: 
1998; Arora & Cason: 1995; Wapner: 1998). Moreover, large companies might experience greater 
flexibility in achieving ambitious voluntary standards. For example, it is unlikely that BP could 
have had such a successful and efficient internal GHG emissions trading program if it hadn't been 
such a large, geographically dispersed corporation.30 The SIZEs variable in this model gives the 
average size of a manufacturing facility in a state, measured as total manufacturing employment 
over the total number of manufacturing facilities in each state, averaged over the years 1989 -
1995.31 It should be noted that the average size of a facility asked to join to 33/50 Program and the 
overall average size of a manufacturing facility might differ, because the EPA targeted the facilities 
that had the largest chemical releases and transfers, i.e., mostly the biggest facilities. While the 
SIZEs variable is therefore not as accurate as desired, it still paints an overall picture of the sizfe of 
manufacturers in each state, and, possibly, the likelihood that facilities were asked to join the 
._$O~.,>- .. "' 
Program and did join. It is expected that the sign on the coefficient of SIZEs will be positive, since, 
in keeping with the theoretical discussion above, bigger facilities see greater pressure to adopt 
environmental protection programs than smaller companies, and the benefits of participation - and 
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the costs of non-participation - might therefore be greater for large fIrms than for small. The 
descriptive statistics for SIZEs appear in Table ll. 
The statewide unemployment rate, denoted URs in this model, is an indicator of general 
economic health in a state, and may also be an indicator of the degree to which workers, including 
unemployed workers, put political emphasis on environmental health and safety issues. It is a 
common belief that there exists a tradeoff between jobs and the environment, particularly among 
industries that are heavily monitored for environmental infractions, like the logging and 
manufacturing industries. Therefore, it may be that states with high unemployment rates have lower 
Program participation rates than other states, because there could be less pressure coming from 
citizens to mitigate environmental hazards than there is to create new jobs - the bargaining power of 
the public, in the presence of high unemployment, might favor a moratorium on new 
environmentally related laws or even a rollback of existing laws. On the other hand, there is a more 
direct link between unemployment rates and participation rates in the other direction: a high 
unemployment rate means that a state's economy has slowed, and that manufacturing production 
might have slowed as well. If a facility sees benefIts to participating in the 33/50 Program, and if 
that facility is not operating at full capacity - full employment - anyway, then the facility may be 
able to claim pollution "reductions" without changing anything about their manufacturing 
processes except that amount of the good that is produced. Avoiding capital and other costs 
typically associated with corporate environmental efforts make it more likely that a fIrm will see the 
benefIts of participation as outweighing the costs, and will therefore be more likely to join the 
Program. In other words, unemployment may promote participation in the Program because it 
makes participation easier: rather than operating at full capacity and changing its production 
processes, a facility can simply cut production and reduce emissions that way. The total 16-and-
over unemployment rate in each state is tallied for each year 1989 - 1995, and then averaged to get 
an average unemployment rate for each state during the planning and implementation parts of the 
33/50 Program.32 Since the link between unemployment and the reduced operation of 
manufacturing facilities is more direct than the link between unemployment, citizen preferences and 
potential policy threats, it is expected that the sign on the coeffIcient of URs will be positive. Data 
for the URs variable come from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Descriptive statistics for URs are available in Table II. 
The fmal variable in this model, CEVSs, is an average of the rate of new manufacturing 
capital expenditures over the value of manufacturing shipments for each year 1989 - 1995.33 The 
larger the value is for this rate, the more expansive is a state's manufacturing economy. Thus, this 
variable proxies manufacturing growth and development within a state. Whereas the 
unemployment rate is a rather pessimistic way to view participation in the Program, the rate of 
capital expenditures over the value of shipments indicates how an expanding economy can also be 
good for the environment. If the new capital being purchased is replacing older, dirtier capital 
equipment, then these expenditures proxy a baseline "greening" of industry. Similarly, if new 
capital is being bought to build new factories, business owners might take the operating efficiency 
of the equipment into account before making the purchase, either assuming that their facilities will 
be subject to increasingly strict environmental regulations, or because it makes sense in terms of 
operating efficiency. Thus, it is expected that the sign on the coefficient of CEVSs will be positive. 
Descriptive statistics for CEVSs appear in Table II. 
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TABLE II: Descriptive Statistics 
PR ASNC AYE. LCV SCM fllliM 
~ 0.312573 0.534948 0.604257 0.982202 0.001601 0.39583 
Median 0.316349 0.549242 0.6105 0.975714 0.001438 0 
Maximum 0.519231 0.792089 0.700333 1.828571 0.005006 1 
Minimum 0.133333 0.182578 0.509333 0.105714 0.000356 0 
::itd, I;2ey. 0.068814 0.143267 0.054594 0.406115 0.001019 0.49420 
::ikewness 0.065412 -0.562096 -0.11614 0.137275 1.61505 0.42601 
Kurtosis 4.495537 3.079706 2.009722 2.414416 5.94072 1.18149 
Jargpe-Bera 4.507492 2.540321 2.069207 0.836573 38.16275 8.06588 
Probability 0.105005 0.280787 0.355367 0.658174 0 0.01772 
Sum 15.00349 25.67752 29.00433 47.14571 0.076844 19 
::ium ::iq. Dey. 0.222561 0.964697 0.140085 7.751686 4.88E-05 11.4792 
:;-
Qbseryations 48 48 48 48 48 48 
PME PSIC IMEC SIZE .uR CEVS 
~ 0.16879 0.056973 103.7708 46.72202 0.057994 0.03527 
Median 0.171888 0.056798 102.75 44.47413 0.058571 0.03302 
Maximum 0.266912 0.098333 138.75 90.50204 0.095286 0.06657 
Minimum fW59422 0.029991 77.25 15.57093 0.027571 0.02119 
Std. Dey. 0.05494 0.013825 14.89902 15.24652 0.011738 0.00843 
Skewness -0.206562 0.439579 0.303183 0.268759 0.169365 1.31566 
Kurtosis 2.296651 3.413832 2.79782 3.299354 4.260633 5.67685 
Jm!lue-Bera 1.330741 1.88835 0.817115 0.757076 3.407867 28.1789 
Probability 0.514083 0.389 0.664608 0.684862 0.181966 0 
::ium 8.101902 2.734689 4981 2242.657 2.783714 1.69295 
Sum Sq. Dey. 0.141865 0.008983 10433.1 10925.45 0.006475 0.00334 
Obs~ations 48 48 48 48 48 48 
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Chapter Four 
Empirical Results and Analysis 
The ordinary least squares regression presented in Chapter Three yields a number of 
significant variables, and the signs on almost all coefficients are as predicted by the theoretical 
considerations. The model is rewritten for reference, and the summary statistics for the regression 
appear below. Table ill provides the critical values needed to conduct tests for statistical 
significance. 
PR s = {3o+ {31ASNCs+ {32AVRs+ {33LCVs+ {34SCMs+ {35PDUMs+ {36PMEs+ {37PSICs+ 
{3sIMECs+ {39SIZEs+ {3lOURs+ {311CEVSs+ & 
Among other things, the original regression analysis shows that the PDUMs variable has a 
very small t-statistic, and is nowhere near significant at the 5% level. In order to find out if PDUMs 
can be dropped from the model without significantly affecting it, an unrestricted model (the original 
model with 11 right-hand side variables) and a restricted model (one without PDUMs in it) must be 
compared. Removing PDUMs from the model might improve the fit of the model because the 
dummy variable for political identification could be positively correlated with LCVs, given that, 
according to the League of Conservation Voters Scorecards, Democrats are far more likely than 
Republicans to support environmental health and safety protection in Congress. It might also be 
positively correlated with SCMs, because, like the politicians they elect, Democratic voters tend to be 
more supportive of environmental protection and public health and equity causes than Republican 
voters. It's worth seeing whether or not the variable can be improved without hurting the fit of the 
model, and possibly improving it. The equation for the restricted model and its summary statistics 
are also given below. 
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Restricted Mode/34: 
PRs = {3o+ {31ASNCs+ {32AVRs+/33LCVs+ {34SCMs+ {36PMEs+ {37PSICs+ 
{3sIMECs+ {39SIZEs+ {3IOURs+ {3I1CEVSs+& 
Original Model 
ASNCs -0.124184** 
(0.05251) 
AVRs 0.221123 
(0.1667757) 
LCVs -0.065883* 
(0.025543) 
SCMs 17.14495 
(10.37398) 
PDUMs 0.016764 
(0.02047) 
PMEs -0.584379*** 
(0.211385) 
PSICs -2.093138*** 
(0.601088) 
IMECs -0.000939 
(0.000777) 
SIZEs 0.004934*** 
(0.00091) 
URs 2.447438** 
(1.022334) 
CEVSs 1.873435* 
(1.09601) 
Summaty Statistics 
Restricted Model 
-0.111592** 
(0.049984) 
0.269495* 
(0.156315) 
-0.057292** 
(0.023185) 
19.03269* 
(10.06954) 
-------------
-------------
-0.626327*** 
(0.20417) 
-2.098319*** 
(0.598374) 
-0.000881 
(0.00077) 
0.005205*** 
(0.000844) 
2.905887*** 
(0.851634) 
1.686566 
(1.067213) 
* = significant at the 10% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
*** = significant at the 1 % level 
The results of an F-test (estimated F = .689 < 4.08) indicate that PDUMs can be dropped 
from the model without reducing the fit of the regressidri:' The adjusted R-squared is actually one 
one-thousandth larger in the restricted model than in the umestricted model. This difference is 
small, but nonetheless important to note, as it shows that the fit of the model is improved by the 
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omission of PDUMs. Removal of PDUMs has the expected positive effects on the potentially 
correlated variables LCVs and SCMs: the coefficient of LCVs becomes less negative, and the 
coefficient of SCMs gets larger. 
The residual plot of the restricted model's regression shows several states whose 
participation rates are over- or under-estimated by the regression. Louisiana, New Hampshire and 
Oregon all have much higher Program participation rates than the model would suggest, and 
Alabama, California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Virginia all have much lower 
participation rates than the model's regression would give. These states range from being the 
largest in the nation (California) to the smallest (Rhode Island) in terms of land area, and the other 
states are representative of moderately sized states. Rhode Island has the lowest participation rate 
(13.3 percent) and Louisiana has the second-to-highest (47 percent). The rest ofthe standout states 
have participation rates much closer to the mean. This model, then, does not bias anyone region of 
the United States, but it may provide inaccurate results for some states. 
Residual Plot for the Restricted Model 
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It is worthwhile testing the variables that are not presumed to be related to public or private 
bargaining power - IMECs, SIZEs, URs and CEVs - for joint significance. According to the 
restricted model, SIZEs and URs have significant and positive effects on participation rates at the 5 
percent level. of significance; these outcomes are in line with what the theoretical argument predicts. 
The variables IMECs and CEVs, though, are not significant to the model, although the signs on their 
coefficients turn out to be as the theory predicts, too. In order to test for joint significance, the fit of 
a new restricted model can be compared to the fit of the "old" restricted model, the model with all 
variables except PDUMs:
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Restricted Model: 
ASNCs 
AVRs 
LCVs 
SCMs 
PMEs 
PSICs 
Summary Statistics 
Restricted Model 
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-0.107177 
(0.071319) 
-0.229329 
(0.180522) 
-0.021141 
(0.027518) 
6.325905 
(10.81921) 
0.356142* 
(0.186846) 
-1.248993* 
(0.730752) 
* = significant at the 10% level 
F-test: 
Ho: {3s = {39 = {3JO = {3tt = 0 
Ha: Oile or more of the equalities above is false: the four variables are jointly significant. 
F = (.180821- .077957) /(10-6) = 12.535 
.077957 / (48 -10) 
Fijg ::= 2.61 at the 5% level of significance 
A 
F > F~s ~ Reject H~ at the 5% level of significance: IMECs,SIZEs,URs and CEVSs are 
jointly significant to the model. 
Table IV compares the expected sign of each of the coefficients to the sign that appears on 
the estimated coefficient for each variable. All but two of the predictions based on theory and 
previous empirical evidence are consistent with the results of the regression. It is interesting, 
however, that the two variables that have unexpected effects on the model are the two variables 
intended to proxy the bargaining power of the regulatory body (ASNCs) and the federal 
government (LCVs). Comparing the absolute values of each coefficient's t-statistic to the t-critical 
value presented in Table ill, it is also evident that the coefficients of both of these variables are 
strongly significant at the 5% level. It is expected in any econometric work that some of the 
independent variables will not prove to be significant, and this expectation is again proven to be the 
case in this model. However, the fact that two highly significant variables have the opposite-of-
expected effect on Program participation rates indicates that the theoretical arguments used to 
justify the inclusion of these variables, and the model itself, must be reconsidered. 
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TABLE ill: Infonnation for Statistical Tests 
degrees of freedom: 48 - 10 = 38 
two-sided test, critical value at 5% LOS: 2.024 
two-sided test, critical value at 10% LOS: 1.686 
TABLE IV: Expected vs. Estimated Signs 
Variable t -statistic Ex~tedSign Estimated Sign 
ASNCs -2.232548 + -
AVRs 1.724054 +/- + 
LCVs -2.471086 + -
SCMs 1.890126 + + 
PMEs -3.067667 - -
PSICs -3.506704 - -
IMECs -1.143896 - -
SIZEs 6.165823 + + 
URs 3.41213 .- + 
.":4-•• !/~ . ~ + 
CEVSs 1.580346 + + 
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Analysis 
As far as the direction of the effect on 33/50 Program participation rates that each variable 
was predicted to take, most of the independent variables performed as expected in the regression. 
The coefficients of four variables - PMEs, PSICs, SIZEs and URs - turn out to be significant at the 
5% level, and their coefficients have the appropriate signs as determined by the theories outlined in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three. It appears that the size of manufacturing's share of state 
employment, and the share of manufacturing employment held by the seven most polluting 
industries, both have negative effects on participation rates. This supports the bargaining power 
theory posited by Segerson and Miceli as applied to the case of the 33/50 Program. After scaling 
the coefficients to account for differences in the magnitude of the numbers by multiplying the 
coefficient on PMEs, one can see that a unit change in the percentage of total employment made up 
of manufacturing employment has a bigger per-unit effect on participation rates that the percent of 
manufacturing employment made up of the seven dirtiest industries. 36 
Two variables, SIZEs and URs, both have positive and significant impacts on participant 
rates at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the economic literature: bigger firms, or 
more precisely states with larger average manufacturing facility sizes, are often found to be 
significantly more likely to voluntarily reduce their harmful environmental impacts in theoretical 
and empirical models. And, rather than discouraging the adoption of environmental initiatives in 
manufacturing, high unemployment rates contribute to high Program participation rates. Scaling 
the coefficients by dividing the coefficient on URs by 1,000 reveals that, other factors held constant, 
average firm size has a larger impact on participation rates than the unemployment rate does. 
The variable representing the rate of membership in the Sierra Club, SCMs, has at-statistic 
of approximately 1.89, which makes the variable significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of 
SCMs has the sign predicted by the theoretical argument: citizens' environmental vigilance is a 
significant motivator for firms. Given the body of theoretical and empirical work which emphasizes 
the importance of community goodwill, and the potential power of local activists proxied by SCMs, 
it's somewhat surprising that the SCMs variable is not more strongly significant. Perhaps other 
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proxies for private environmental vigilance would yield different results. It would be interesting to 
differentiate among the various forms of civic activism and to empirically determine which forms of 
activism are the most effective. That is a topic for a different paper, though. The coefficient on 
SCMs appears to be very large in the regression output, indicating very large changes in 
participation rates for corresponding unit changes in the value of SCMs, but this is, again, a result of 
the fact that the data, measured as Sierra Club membership over state population, have very small 
values. If the coefficient is scaled to that of A VRs, another proxy for political attentiveness, the 
coefficient on SCMs would actually have a coefficient of just .1903. 
Three other variables, A VRs, CEVs and IMECs, prove to be insignificant to the model, but 
nonetheless have the signs predicted by the aforementioned theoretical arguments. The most 
intriguing outcomes of the regression are certainly those pertaining to the proxies for the 
bargaining power of the regulatory body and the legislative body of government, ASNCs and LCVs. 
These results will be discussed in tum. 
The ASNCs variable was described in Chapter Two as a proxy for the level of mandatory 
regulatory threat that the facilities invited to join the 33/50 Program would have felt when making 
their participation decisions, as it represents the average number of addressed episodes of 
significant non-compliance with existing toxic chemical regulations. The theoretical model of the 
relative bargaining powers of a regulatory body and an industry put forth by Segerson and Miceli 
concludes that voluntary participation in an environmental program will become more likely as the 
bargaining power of the regulatory body increases, and less likely as it decreases in relation to a 
firm's bargaining power. By this logic, the higher the average level of addressed significant non-
compliance with existing regulation was in a state, the higher the participation rate of firms in that 
state should have been. The empirical evidence gives the opposite conclusion, though: the stricter 
the enforcement of EPA toxics regulations in a state, the less likely were firms to participate in the 
Program. 
One possible explanation for this outcome is th~t~nforcement could be correlated with 
,'," ' ... .. . 
some understood agreemerit between the EPA arid firms whereby the EPA agrees to cut firms some 
regulatory slack in return for the firms agreeing to join the 33/50 Program. If this were the case, 
then participation rates would increase as enforcement decreases, as they do in the model's 
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regression. Arora and Cason considered this possibility of preferential treatment for voluntarily 
participating firms, and compared the list of participating Program companies to the list of 
companies that had been penalized under the Toxic Substances and Control Act (TSCA). They 
fmd that eight out of 23 (35 percent) of the companies penalized under TSCA were enrolled in the 
33/50 Program, and that the finn with the largest TSCA fine ($17 million), Chevron, was a full 
participant in the Program. They mention another Program participant that was cited $4.8 million 
in TSCA fmes. Arora and Cason conclude that Program participation does not, in fact, free a 
company from regulatory obligations (Arora & Cason: 1995,273). 
Arora and Cason's anecdotal evidence seems to disprove the hypothesis that firms and the 
EPA trade participation in the 33/50 Program for less stringent enforcement of mandatory 
environmental health and safety legislation. Alternative models of enforcement and compliance, 
however, present strong theoretical evidence that a regulatory body may "make a deal" with a 
polluter in one context to increase the aggregate level of compliance over a variety of environmental 
programs and polluters (Heyes & Rickman: 1998; Amacher & Malik: 1996). Economists 
Anthony Heyes and Neil Rickman propose a theoretical model in which the regulator is tolerant of 
noncompliance at some times and with some firms in order to bring about higher levels of 
comQliance at other times and with other regulated firms (Heyes & Rickman: 1998). Their theory 
is an attempt to explain why firms are compliant with regulation a significant portion of the time 
even though the EPA rarely pursues violators and the expected penalty for noncompliance is 
usually less costly than the equipment needed to actually achieve compliance. They theoretically 
test the hypothesis that the EPA uses a strategy of selective penalizing to maximize aggregate, 
steady-state compliance over firms in a number of enforcement areas, i.e., over a set of laws 
regulating the use and disposal of different types of pollution over a variety of media (air, 
groundwater, etc.). Heyes and Rickman conclude that "regulatory dealing," as they call it, can in 
fact, "buy" the compliance of a large portion of the regulated population by penalizing a select few 
companies in a subset of regulatory spheres (Heyes & Rickman: 1998,373). 
Their results suggest that the EPA's failure to address a large percentage of regulatory 
violations in some states may not be evidence of lax enforcement, but rather evidence of strategic 
enforcement. This possibility calls into question the validity of Segerson and Miceli's bargaining 
power theory, since one could infer from Heyesand Rickman's conclusion that the the EPA 
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actually conserves its bargaining power through strategic, selective penalization rather than flex all 
of its regulatory muscle at once. This could explain why higher rates of ASNCs are shown to 
reduce participation in the 33/50 Program. The EPA enforcement activities in those states may not 
have been coordinated enough to utilize a system of "strategic tolerance of non-compliance," a 
situation which, if Reyes and Rickman's model translates to reality, would have reduced overall 
compliance (including voluntary compliance, perhaps) with toxics regulation among industries 
(Reyes & Rickman: 1998,366). 
If the EPA does in fact derive its ability to threaten fInns from its ability to selectively 
pursue non-compliance, then its ability to have sway over companies diminishes every time an 
enforcement action takes place. Evidence in support of this hypothesis can be found in Figure One 
below, which illustrates the statistical relationship between the EPA's level of enforcement of 
existing toxic regulations (ASNCs) and Program participation rates. The data used in the chart 
come from ordering the 51 observations for ASNCs andPRs in ascending order of participation 
rates, and then dividing the observations into three groups of 17. The average ASNCs and PRs for 
the each section are the six points that make up the two lines; each group average appears next to 
the appropriate point in Figure One. While the relationship is not perfectly linear, there is a 
consistent inverse relationship between ASNCs and PRs. 
Figure One: Potential Loss of EPA Bargaining Power 
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This trend can also be seen, although not as clearly, in Figure Three. There is no way of 
knowing, given the data available, whether lower rates of addressed SNCs occur because of 
strategic bargaining or because of, for example, tight budgets that do not allow for much pursuit of 
violators. If SNCs were not addressed because of budget problems, though, fIrms may not have 
perceived the same threat level as if SNCs remained unaddressed because the EPA was conserving 
its bargaining power. If it can be assumed that lower values for ASNCs occur when the EPA 
operation in that state is conserving its bargaining power to engage in strategic bargaining, then the 
empirical results could have some interesting interpretations. If the assumption holds, then the 
relationship between EPA enforcement rates and 33/50 Program participation rates provides some 
empirical evidence for the theoretical hypothesis that cooperative, strategic regulatory bargaining 
yields higher voluntary participation rates in environmental programs than simply strict 
enforcement. This is an area of study that deserves more empirical testing. 
This bargaining game suggests that cooperative game theory could be used to explain or at 
least investigate the EPA's enforcement strategies. Gregory S. Amacher and Arun S. Malik do, in 
fact, present a theoretical model in which the environmental regulatory body and the regulated fIrm 
employ a Nash bargaining game to engage in what Heyes and Rickman call "regulatory 
bargaining'.? (Amacher & Malik: 1996). According to Amacher and-Malik, in a two-party, 
cooperative Nash bargaining game, both parties will be better off if the regulator has the same 
objectives as society (Le., wants to reduce the social costs of pollution) and if both parties cooperate 
when making their decisions. The model proposed by Amacher and Malik is, like Heyes and 
Rickman's model, in opposition to the traditional model of regulatory standard-setting, enforcement 
and compliance in which the regulator dictates standards to the polluter and the polluter follows the 
standards. The traditional model is what Segerson and Miceli ·seem to have in mind when 
presenting their bargaining power theory, and, unlike the Nash model, is a non-cooperative model in 
which the regulator leads and the fIrm follows, or vice-versa, depending on which party has more 
bargaining power. 
Amacher and Malik also consider the fact thai'lliird parties can become involved in the 
bargaining process and affect the outcome, and incorporate this consideration into their model. A 
third party that has a fairly passive impact on the way a regulator weighs a firm's costs of 
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mitigation, for example, can be introduced into their model, or the authors can incorporate a third 
party that makes strict and unwavering demands, like an environmental lobbying group that refuses 
to accept anything less than the cleanest possible technology (Amacher & Malik: 1996,250 - 251). 
Amacher and Malik do not state the effect that strong environmental or industrial lobbying would 
have on the outcome of their model, but they do state that third parties do, in fact, attempt to 
influence the pure two-party bargaining game. 
Heyes and Rickman also test a variation of their model in which private individuals and 
environmental interest groups are allowed to fIle citizen suits against non-compliant facilities if the 
government fails to enforce regulations. Obviously, citizen suits might throw a cog in the gears of 
any regulatory body's strategic enforcement scheme, if such schemes exist. Their model suggests 
that, predictably, the threat of being sued by a non-governmental body reduces the value that an 
EPA "bribe" will have for a ftrm, since the violating firm may be judicially regulated by citizens 
even if its discretions are strategically ignored by the EPA (Heyes & Rickman: 1998, 370). The 
importance of their theoretical outcome to the empirical model of voluntary participation in the 
33/50 Program presented in this paper is ambiguous, though, because high rates of Sierra Club 
membership (SCMs) - which proxies for the level of citizens' bargaining power in environmental 
regulatory decision making - are shown to increase the rate of Program participation at the 10% 
level cif signillcance, rather than lower the aggregate level of compliancel participation, as the 
Heyes-Rickman model suggests would occur. This calls into question whether citizens suits and 
an environmentally active population are substitutes for EPA enforcement and standards, or 
complements. Does private activism have an independent positive effect on Program participation 
rates in states with uncoordinated EP As, or do the two variables interact in some way? Answering 
this question is important for further interpretation of the ASNCs and SCMs coefficient estimations, 
and an analysis of the problem is presented below. 
Perhaps ASNCs and SCMs are not actually independent of one another; if they are 
substitutes, then an inactive EPA might motivate the public to become more environmentally 
vigilant, or maybe an active EPA makes the public less-ittentive to environmental problems. If the 
two variables are complements, then the two "regulators," one citizen-led and one EPA-led, either 
spur each other on or share a loose approach to enforcement. Heyes and Rickman do not propose 
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which relationship occurs more often, or to what effect, but they do comment on the potential for 
there to be a consistent complement or substitute relationship between the two forces (Heyes and 
Rickman: 1998,371). 
In an attempt to investigate the possible positive or negative correlations between public and 
private environmental vigilance, the state-by-state data for SCMs and ASNCs can be compared; the 
results of this comparison are in Figure Two below. If public and private concern and enforcement 
are substitutes, then SCMs should be high whenASNCs is low, and vice-versa. If they are 
complements, then the two variables should travel together. The values used to plot SCMs are 
scaled to make the graph more readable (the SCMs values used in the empirical model are 
multiplied by 100 for use in Figure Two). 
The picture in Figure Two suggests that public and private environmental vigilance act as 
both substitutes and complements in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, if existing 
substitute/ complement relationships are anything more than statistical coincidence. According to 
the graph, ASNCs and SCMs act as substitutes in 31 instances (61 percent) and complements in 20 
instances (39 percent). There is no geographical pattern to the substitute/ complement relationship 
between the two variables. 
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The ASNCs and SCMs variables can also be mathematically tested for interaction. The 
regression output below allows for the possibility of an interaction between regulatory and citizen-
led pressure on polluters. According to the output, the possible interaction between ASNCs and 
SCMs is not significant to this model. 
ASNCs 
SCMs 
Summary Statistics 
Interaction Test Model 
-0.107177 
(0.071319) 
6.325905 
ASNCs*SCMs 
(10.81921) 
37.42257 
(88.06068) 
More important than pinning down the relationship between the two sources of potential 
regulatory threat, though, is figuring out whether one type of relationship is more desirable than the 
other, i.e., whether a complementary relationship is associated with higher participation rates, or 
vice-versa. To test whether the nature of the relationship between ASNCs and SCMs bas anything 
to do with 33/50 Program participation rates, Figure Three plots those two variables with 
participation rates in ascending order. It appears that the relationship between public and private 
environmental vigilance has no relationship to state-level Program participation rates. It is not as 
though the states with a complementary ASNCsI SCMs relationship are all states with lower 
participation rates, or vice versa. Heyes and Rickman might be correct, then, in failing to draw 
conclusions about the effect that the relationship between public and private enforcement has on 
firms' compliance decisions. This is a topic that would benefit from further empirical study. If 
there is some interaction between the EPA's level of vigilance and that of citizen groups like the 
Sierra Club, then perhaps that interaction could be expIQi!~cl to increase polluters' compliance rates 
and reduce the social costs of monitoring, enforcement and abatement. It might be interesting to 
look at possible cause-and-effect links between socioeconomic variables and the relationship 
between public and private enforcement tendencies. Any lessons that could be drawn regarding a 
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clear trend would be useful in designing public policy and, in particular, regulatory strategies. The 
empirical model does indicate, though, that the EPA's actions have more consistent impacts on 
Program participation rates than do the active membership rolls of environmental citizens' groups, 
as ASNCs is sigmficant below the 5% level, and SCMs is significant below the 10% level. 
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Amacher and Malik's paper, like Heyes and Rickman's, implies that ASNCs may not be an 
appropriate proxy for the bargaining power of the regulator, since the rate at which known 
violations are pursued may not accurately reflect the political might of the regulatory body. Both of 
these papers suggest that low levels of enforcement in one area of regulations might actually be 
used as leverage - bargaining power - to increase compliance in other areas. Perhaps the three EPA 
programs chosen for the ASNCs variable, EPCRA, TSCA and RCRA, are the standards 
"sacrificed" by the EPA in order to bribe firms into complying with other programs. If this is the 
case, then large values for ASNCs could signal a state in which the EPA does not bargain with 
regulated firms, and finns can therefore not be induced to voluntarily participate in the 33/50 
Program. Again, this paper and model would benefit from further theoretical and empirical 
investigation into the relationship between enforcement of existing toxic waste mitigation programs 
and voluntary participation in an additional program, like the 33/50 Program, as well as possible 
strategies.used by regulators. 
The other curious outcome of this regression involves LCVs, the variable that proxies the 
"greenness," or level of environmental consideration, of a state's delegation to Congress. 
Segerson and Miceli's bargaining power theory concludes that higher levels of perceived threat of 
mandatory regulation spur companies to voluntarily reduce emissions because compliance-with 
mandatory abatement regulation is always more expensive than achieving the same levels of 
abatement voluntarily. Their model assumes that transaction (and enforcement) costs of mandatory 
compliance are always higher than those of voluntary abatement; this is a commonly accepted 
theory (Segerson & Miceli: 1998; Wu & Babcock: 1999; Khanna: 2001). Thus, it seems safe to 
presume that, the higher the rate with which a state's elected members of Congress vote in favor of 
protecting the environment, the higher the perceived threat of future mandatory legislation and the 
Program participation rate will be. The empirical results show that the opposite is true: the more 
often a state's u.s. senators and representatives vote in favor of environmental protection, the less 
likely firms within that state will be to voluntarily join the Program. If the League of Conservation 
Voters rating of Congress is in fact an accurate proxy f6~'ih~e environmental leanings of elected 
representatives, then the only possible explanation seems to be that the greenness of a state's 
Congressional delegation does not pose a threat to the state's manufacturing industries. 
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Perhaps this is true, that the link between federal government and environmental regulatory 
threat on the state level is not very strong. If this were the case but Segerson and Miceli's theory of 
regulatory threat remained true, though, the coefficient on LCVs would have been insignificant, but 
positive. Instead, the coefficient is negative and significant. This suggests that passing formal, 
binding environmental legislation actually discourages participation in voluntary environmental 
programs. There is no available literature on the effect that the passage of new, mandatory 
environmental legislation has on participation in related voluntary programs, but one might 
hypothesize, in accordance with Heyes and Rickman's theory, that imposing new legislation 
removes some of the bargaining power held by the public regulatory body. If passing mandatory 
legislation is, in effect, making good on old regulatory threats, then passage would relieve some of 
the threat of legislation perceived by finns and thereby reduce the relative bargaining power of 
government. If, for example, a father threatens to make his daughter clean her room if she doesn't 
stop bothering her brother and ends up making her clean her room for another reason, then the 
daughter no longer has any incentive to stop pestering her brother. Similarly, a regulation that has 
been passed into law can no longer be held over polluters' heads as a potential threat. Figure Four 
illustrates the average trend in participation rates versus the "greenness" of government, or proxied 
level of legislative threat. 
Figure Four: Potential Loss of Legislative Bargaining Power 
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While the negative relationship between PRs and LCVs is not as pronounced in Figure Four 
as the relationship between PRs andASNCs in Figure One, the empirical evidence does support the 
theory that Congress can bring about higher voluntary participation rates if it conserves some of its 
legislative bargaining power. This is another intriguing area of further analysis that would benefit 
the interpretation of this model's empirical results. 
Empirical Conclusions 
The results regarding public and private bargaining power, both the unexpected effects of 
ASNCs and LCVs on participation rates and the as-expected signs of the coefficient estimations of 
the variables proxying industry bargaining power (PMEs and PSICs), are interesting because they 
complicate some aspects of the model's theoretical foundation. Segerson and Miceli's theory of 
bargaining power that does not allow for cooperative, strategic bargaining is called into question by 
the fact that states with seemingly more pro-environment legislators and regulators have lower 
Program participation rates than seemingly less eco-oriented enforcement and legislative threats, all 
other factors held constant. These results, coupled with the theoretical models of strategic 
regulatory enforcement, suggest that ~ooperative bargaining between the regulator and the regulated 
has a positive effect on participation rates in the 33/50 Program and, possibly, other voluntary 
programs. Moreover, the negative coefficients on ASNCs and LCVs lend credence to a bargaining 
theory in which the regulator and the legislative body hold on to their enforcement and mandatory 
regulatory chips, as it were, in order to gain an advantage at the compliance! voluntary participation 
bargaining table. The data on enforcement vs. participation rates in Figure One and legislative 
"greenness" vs. participation rates in Figure Four provide cursory visual evidence of this theory in 
action in the real world. Private environmental interest groups and candidates for elective office 
often tout the benefits of a regulatory body that is not willing to make deals with polluters. This 
may sound like a good idea from a rhetorical and political standpoint, but if it results in less-than-
maximal compliance rates and higher overall costs to society, is it really in the best interests of the 
public? Maybe not, the alternative strategic bargaining theory suggests. 
More empirical research needs to be done to identify incidences of environmental 
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regulatory bargaining in the real world, and to test the effects of such bargaining on total steady 
compliance rates, pollution abatements and social costs. In particular, further research might 
expose a low point of enforcement past whlch the regulator ceases to be a threat because it never or 
very rarely enforces any laws or pursues any cases of non-compliance. On the flip side, further 
investigation might also illuminate a high point of enforcement past which fIrms will begin to have 
higher participation rates as the enforcement level increases. This latter situation would 
theoretically only occur if the fees or other costs of non-compliance were raised beyond the costs 
of compliance for all fIrms. 
It remains unclear whether or not there is a consistent relationship between regulatory 
enforcement strategies and environmental vigilance and! or judicial action on behalf of citizens, and 
how a possible relationship might affect voluntary participation rates. The empirical evidence 
nonetheless shows that the rate of Sierra Club membership, as a proxy for citizens' environmental 
vigilance, has an overall positive effect on Program participation, although its significance is not as 
great as was expected. Again, the possibility that activists' and regulators' strategies for inducing 
firms to comply with regulation is intriguing, and deserves further attention. If such a substitute or 
complementary relationship is empirically proven to exist, then perhaps it could be used to bring 
about high rates of voluntary action at low costs to society. 
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Chapter Five 
What Impact Does This Evidence Have on Climate Policy? 
This paper began with a discussion of climate change, the nascent state of climate policy 
and fInns' motivations for voluntarily reducing carbon dioxide emissions, but a lack of data on the 
fIrms and emissions reduction credit trading (ERC) systems forced the empirical analysis to focus 
on fmns' motivations for voluntary compliance in another area, that of toxic chemical use. The 
empirical results can be used, though, to identify the "pressure points" that should be pushed in 
order to make the greatest gains in voluntary compliance with GHG abatement programs and, 
therefore, the greatest aggregate reductions in GHG emissions. The interpretation of the relevant 
variables in the context of potential voluntary or mandatory climate policy is given below. 
Some of the variables used in the empirical model are of little practical relevance to 
bureaucrats and businesspeople who want to design voluntary GHG abatement policies. The 
unemployment rate, for example, is not exactly a "pressure point" that can or should be exploited 
to increase the rate of volunteerism. Politicians, no matter how environmentally conscious an 
electorate they hope to represent, are unlikely to campaign on the basis of rising unemployment 
rates and falling impacts on global warming. Moreover, climate change can be addressed without 
pushing people out of their jobs. Similarly, macroeconomic factors like the index of the change in 
manufacturing employment (IMECs) are of limited use to policy makers. Changing a 
macroeconomic variable like the size of the manufacturing industry within a state involves actually 
moving those companies and jobs to other states or countries, and simply moving a factory to 
somewhere else does not actually reduce global GHG emissions. Some pundits who profess to be 
climate change authorities say that moving U.S. industry overseas not only lowers the cost of 
goods to U.S. consumers, but also reduces U.S. contributions to climate change. While U.S. fIrms 
would technically be belching out less pollution if industry was shipped overseas, such 
commentators do not understand the systematic nature of the climate change issue. Even though 
the emissions would not be produced on American soil.)~ thegoods would be made in factories in 
developing countries, which tend to have lower pollution standards than the United States, and 
shipped here in vehicles powered by fossil fuels. And, as was previously mentioned, eliminating 
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u.s. jobs is usually not a selling point for any policy. 
There are industrial factors which affect voluntary participation rates that can be utilized in 
promoting voluntary emissions reductions, though. A company that is expanding its facilities, or a 
new company that is setting up shop, may find itself well positioned to join a permit trading 
program, as the positive result for the estimated coefficient on the manufacturing capital 
expenditures over value of sales variable (CEVs) indicates. While this variable is not found to be 
significant in the model, it could become a significant driver of participation if new firms or firms 
undertaking capital improvements were actively recruited to join trading programs. And, if a trading 
program is used as part of mandatory GHG legislation, then firms buying new capital would have a 
strong incentive to purchase the "cleanest" equipment possible, assuming the marginal cost of the 
cleaner-running equipment is lower than the marginal cost of compliance, if it costs more at all. As 
was stated in the theoretical section of the paper, though, the costs of non-compliance perceived by 
polluters should go up as the threat of mandatory regulation increases, which would make the 
additional expense of emissions-saving investments seem like less of a barrier. 
The size of a company, according to this analysis and many others, is a contributing factor 
to the participation decision. Policies that focus on bigger companies, at least initially, will have 
higher rates of voluntary compliance. This happens for a number of reasons. For example, large 
firms tend to have more funds earmarked for specialized projects and they often attract more publicI 
stakeholder scrutiny (and praise, in the case of BP). In other words, large firms see greater net 
benefits to participation than do small- and medium-sized firms. Large firms also tend to have 
more funds on hand to finance non-essential projects than small- or medium-sized firms. 
Promoting a voluntary abatement strategy among large firms might also make smaller firms take 
notice and want to get on board, according to theories of corporate and industry leadership. 
The original hypothesis of this paper states that voluntary participation can be motivated by 
increasing the strength of the regulatory body's threat of mandatory legislation relative to the 
industry's strength to resist such legislation. The counterintuitive empirical results, however, reveal 
the presence of a more complicated system of threats~-efiforcement and industry power. If the 
results given by the model are accurate, and if an EPA and Congress that are tough on polluters 
represent regulatory bargaining power, then the last thing environmentalists would want is more 
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"bargaining power," since voluntary industry participation would decrease! The simpler theory of 
bargaining power does not seem to produce the desired results in the real world. 
It should be mentioned again that the theory advanced by Heyes and Rickman depends on, 
among other things, the (accurate) assumption that the expected penalty for non-compliance that a 
polluter faces is lower than the cost of compliance (Heyes & Rickman: 1999,362). This begs the 
question: why not simply impose mandatory legislation for carbon dioxide emissions and set the 
penalties for non-compliance higher than the costs of compliance? The answer is that politics 
controls legislation in the United States, and the negative and strongly significant coefficients on the 
variables for the manufacturing industry's regulatory/ political clout within a state (PMEs and 
PSICs) give evidence of the sway that polluters seem to have over public policy. Witness President 
George Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney: since gaining office three years ago, the two have 
often been accused of being beholden to fossil fuel interests and, 10 and behold, removing the 
United States from the Kyoto treaty was one of the first things Bush did in office. While the 
PMEs and PSICs variables are negatively correlated with Program participation rates at the one 
percent level of significance, A VRs and SCMs are positively correlated with participation rates at the 
10 percent level of significance: individual citizens have little power against big industrial interest 
groups~-In-addition, ASNCs and LCVs, vari~bles intended to prm~-y the regulatory and legislative 
.. threat levels, have negative and strongly significant coefficients: the forces that are supposed to 
impose limits on pollution are forced, in part because of penalties set lower than compliance costs, 
to bargain with violators to achieve the highest possible level of compliance. The results of the 
empirical model suggest that, at least in the case of toxics regulation, manufacturers hold the 
majority of the bargaining power. The results and theory imply that regulators are forced to strike a 
deal with regulatees, not the other way around. 
It is highly likely that, in the context of the alternative and more complex bargaining theory 
introduced in the empirical analysis, the ASNCs and LCVs variables turn out to have negative 
impacts on Program participation rates because higher enforcement rates and higher pro-
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environment voting averages are actually representative of reduced governmental bargaining power, 
not of legislative or regulatory threats of stricter pollution standards. Posing a threat to polluters is 
still necessary, according to the model, but the threat that the EPA and Congress poses to polluters 
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essentially comes from having their hands tied. The empirical results show that the EPA and 
Congress will never be able to pose more than weak threats which, according to Segerson and 
Miceli's paper, is a condition that will always yield low levels of pollution abatement (Segerson & 
Miceli: 1998, 128). If the alternative theory of strategic bargaining holds true, then legislators who 
want to see climate change policy enacted should not actually pass laws regulating emissions, just 
propose them. Even if this strategy poses a threat to industry at ftrst, there is likely to be a point at 
which the threat breaks down; this possibility needs to be investigated further. If legislators are 
more concerned with retaining their bargaining power than setting the aggressive GHG emissions 
reductions needed to mitigate the potential threat of climate change, then the ultimate crisis may not 
be averted. Due to the nature of the problem and the short timeframe in which reductions on the 
order of 70 percent below 1990 emissions levels must be made, the typical political strategy of 
"muddling through" will not be enough to get the job done.37 
But what if Congress and the EPA - and the public - actually did represent serious 
regulatory threats rather than minor players in one of the most important games that public policy 
has ever had to play? The only way to change the roles of the players is to change the rules of the 
game. Emissions permit trading plays the regulatory game from another angle: rather than raise the 
price of the penalty, a well-designed trading system would simply lower the costs of compliance 
until the beneftts of compliance outweigh the costs, and even turn some of those costs into beneftts 
through the sale of excess permits. If politics is not going to address the problem of climate 
change quickly and effectively, then market forces must be utilized to avoid potential catastrophe. 
It might be productive to eliminate the entire concept of "bargaining power" in regulation 
altogether and replace it with the notion of "market incentives." Rather than raise the penalty for 
non-compliance, regulators should lower the total costs of compliance in a variety of ways while 
maintaining ambitious abatement targets. Emissions trading provides an opportunity to change the 
nature of pollution control by giving ftrms a flexible way to reduce aggregate emissions at marginal 
costs lower than the costs of compliance with a command-and-control abatement program that has 
comparable reduction targets (Wu & Babcock: 1999;' Segerson & Miceli: 1998). A voluntary 
emissions trading program changes the very meaning of regulation because rather than imposing 
rules and technology standards that must be followed to the letter, the organizer of a voluntary 
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agreement simply sets an abatement goal and provides a framework in which participants can freely 
buy and sell emissions reduction credits to achieve compliance with the target. Such a program 
need not be voluntary, and it might in fact yield even more significant emissions reductions if the 
abatement targets are supported by the law . . The EPA's Acid Rain Program, for example, has more 
than achieved its goals, and firms have been actively trading in ERCs. Given the presence of the 
inherently imbalanced and overly politicized power relationship between regulators and polluters, 
perhaps the "stick" approach to regulation should be abandoned in favor of "carrots"; incentives, 
rather than penalties, should be emphasized. Emissions trading is a policy model that uses carrots 
before it uses sticks: firms can not only avoid penalties, but can also make money by reducing 
emissions beyond the required level. The effectiveness of permit trading in terms of the volume of 
GHGs abated depends on the structure of the program, the price of a permit and a number of other 
factors that could fill a research paper of their own. 
In conclusion, the bargaining that public officials and private firms engage in now can be 
avoided, and significant reductions in greenhouse gas emission made, if the costs of compliance 
with either a voluntary or a mandatory abatement target are brought to a point lower than the 
benefits of participation in such a program. The results of the empirical model reveal that, currently, 
having the "bargaining power" of the regulator outweigh the bargaining power of the regulatee 
actually actually means strategic and incomplete enforcement of existing mandatory environmental 
programs and passage of little, if any, new legislation. This is a game in which the regulator and, by 
extension, the public, only wins by remaining beholden to polluters and their private cost functions. 
If the fundamentals of this game can be changed so that the public and private interest work in 
progressive unison, then rational, profit-maximizing firms would have no incentive not to reduce 
their GHG emissions. By targeting the bigger firms first and encouraging those firms to lead their 
respective industries; by providing incentives for companies to install cleaner and more energy-
efficient equipment when capital comes up for replacement; by encouraging firms to produce 
products and services for environmentally minded consumers and communities; and by endorsing a 
policy or program whereby those firms that go beyond;poglRliance can actually profit from their 
efforts, policy makers can begin to construct an incentive framework to induce sizable voluntary 
reductions in the emission of greenhouse gases. 
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area to be populated by poor people, but the general conclusion that high levels of pollution and wealthy 
populations don't mix still holds true. 
16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "33/S0 Program: The Final Record." Office of Pollution Prevention and 
Toxic. Ref. #: EPA-74S-R-99-004. March 1999. Available online: 
<http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/33S0/33fin04.htm> Accessetl-l-'3-Nov. 2002. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Arora and Cason: 1995, 276. 
19 Data Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. "FY 
1991 - FY 1996 State-by-State Enforcement Data Summaries." August 2000. 
20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website. Enforcement Programs. Available online: 
<www.epa.gov/compliance/civiVprograms/index.html> Accessed 12 Feb. 2003. 
21 Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 U.S. Census. Available online: <www.census.gov> Accessed 12 Jan. 
2003 . 
22 Data Source: League of Conservation Voters. 1989 - 1995 National Environmental Scorecards. Available online: 
<www.lcv.orglscorecardlarchive.asp> Accessed 16 Nov. 2002. 
23 Data Source: Sierra Club State-by-State Membership 1990 - 1996. Spreadsheet, obtained via e-mail from the 
Sierra Club. Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. ST-99-3: "State Population Estimates: Annual Time Series, July 
1, 1990 to July 1, 1999." Dec. 29, 1999. Available online: <eire.census.gov/popestlarchives/state/st-99-3.txt> 
Accessed 15 Jan. 2003. 
24 Data Source: Associated Press. "Political Inclination ofthe States." Jan. 9, 2003. Available online: 
<www.boston.comldailynews/009/regionIPoliticaUnclination_oCthe_sP.shtml> Accessed 9 Jan. 2003. 
2S Data Source: League of Conservation Voters. 1989 - 1995 National Environmental Scorecards. Available online: 
<www.lcv.org/scorecard/archive.asp> Accessed 16 Nov. 2002. 
26 Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 U.S. Census. Available online: <www.census.gov> Accessed 12 Jan. 
2003. 
27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "33/50 Program: The Final Record." Office of Pollution Prevention and 
Toxic. Ref. #: EPA-745-R-99-004. March 1999. 4. Available online: 
<http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/33fin04.htm> Accessed 13 Nov. 2002. 
28 Arora and Cason: 1995. 
29 U.S. Census Bureau. 1995 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Geographic Area Statistics." April 1997. Available 
online: <www.census.gov/prodl2lmanmin> Accessed 16 Jan. 2003. 
30 For a complete description ofBP's internal GHG emissions trading program and program results, please consult 
BP's Internal Trading Program in the Appendix to this paper. 
31 Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1995 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Geographic Area Statistics." April 
1997. Available online: <www.census.gov/prodl2/manmin> Accessed 16 Jan. 2003. 
32 U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment." 
Available online: <data.bls.gov/cgi-binlsurveymost?gp> Accessed 18 Jan. 2003. 
33 Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1995 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Geographic Area Statistics." April 
1997. Available online: <www.census.gov/prodl2/manmin> Accessed 16 Jan. 2003. 
34 This restricted model is the final model that will be used for further analysis. 
3S From this point forward, the "old" restricted model, the model that omits the dummy variable PDUMs, will be 
referred to as "the model," and its regression results used in the subsequent analysis. ' 
36 The data used in the model could have been scaled before running the regressions. However, the size of the 
coefficients can be made more easily comparable without affeciitlg 'interpretations of significance by scaling the 
coefficients in line with how the raw data could have been scaled. 
37 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that total GHG emissions levels must be reduced 
by this amount in order avoid the detrimental effects of global climate change. The need for this quantity of 
reductions stems primarily from the fact that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are persistent, and can stay 
in the atmosphere and continue to heat the planet for up to hundreds of years (IPCC 2001; IPCC 2001b). 
APPENDIX 
Voluntary Private-Sector Participants: This list represents a nearly complete sampling of the 
private, for-profit companies that are either helping to design a GHG emissions trading program, 
are engaged in an existing trading system, or both. The companies are listed in alphabetical order, 
and are paired with their associated trading program(s). 
Key: CCX = Chicago Climate Exchange (www.chicagoc1imatex.com) 
C02e.com = C02e.com! Cantor Fitzgerald (www.C02e.com) 
lET A = International Emissions Trading Association (www.ieta.org) 
Pew Center = The Pew Center for Global Climate Change (www.pewclimate.org) 
Firm . Ti"adina= Proa=rams! Association 
ABB Pew Center 
Air Products and Chemicals Inc. Pew Center 
Alcan lETA 
Alcoa Pew Center 
Alliant Energy Corp. CCX 
American Electric Power CCX, IETA, Pew Center 
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. lETA 
Baker & Mackenzie Solicitors and Attorneys IETA 
Baxter Pew Center 
Boeing Pew Center 
BPI BP America CCX, C02e.com, IETA, Pew Center 
Cemex CCX 
CHZMHILL Pew Center 
Cinergy CCX, Pew Center 
CMS Generation Co. CCX 
C02e.com IETA 
Davies Ward Phillips & Vineburg LLP IETA 
DeBrauw Blackstone Westbroek IETA 
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) IETA 
Deutsche Borse IETA 
Deutsche Telecom Pew Center 
DTEI DTE Energy CCX, Pew Center 
DuPont! DuPont Canada CCX, C02e.com, IETA, Pew Center 
EmC Emission Control s.r.1. IETA 
Encana IETA 
, " ~t~';;' " ... "1 . .,.-- ,_, 
Endesa Trading IETA 
Entergy Pew Center 
Enterprises pour l'Environment IETA 
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Firm Tradinl: Programsl Association 
Environmental Resources Management lETA 
Eskom lETA 
ESP lETA 
Evolution Markets lETA 
Exelon Corp. CCX 
First Energy Corp. CCX 
Ford Motor Company CCX, C02e.com 
Gaz de France lETA 
Georgia-Pacific Pew Center 
Grupo IMSA, SA de CV CCX 
Ho1cim Pew Center 
mM Pew Center 
Industrial Technology Research Institute lETA 
Innovation & Technology CenterlRoscorri lETA 
Intel Pew Center 
Interface Inc. Pew Center 
International Paper CCX 
John Hancock Pew Center 
KPMG lETA 
Lafarge lETA 
Lloyds Register lETA 
LockHeed Martin Pew Center 
Manitoba Hydro CCX 
May tag Pew Center 
MeadWestvaco Corp. CCX 
Midwest Generation EME, LLC CCX 
Natsource lETA 
NiSource CCX 
Norsk Hydrol Norsk Hydro ASA C02e.com, lETA 
Norsk Hydro ASA lETA 
Novartis Pew Center 
Nuon lETA 
Ontario Power Generation CCX, C02e.com, lETA, Pew Center 
PG & E Corp.! National Energy Group ·eCX-,Pew Center 
Pinnacle West Corp CAPS) CCX 
Point Carbon lETA 
PricewaterhouseCoopers lETA 
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Firm Trading Programs! Association 
PT. Indonesia Power lETA 
Rio Tinto Pew Center 
Rohm and Hass Pew Center 
Royal Dutch! Shell Group! Shell International C02e.com, lETA, Pew Center 
SC Johnson Pew Center 
SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance SA IEfA 
ST Microelectronics, Inc. CCX 
Statoil C02e.com, lETA 
Stora Enso North America CCX 
Suddeutschland . IEfA 
Suncor Energy CCX, C02e.com, lETA 
Sunoco, Inc. Pew Center 
SwissRe IEfA 
Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. CCX 
Texaco C02e.com 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) C02e.com, lETA 
Tokyo Mitsubishi Securities IEfA 
TotalFina Elf lETA 
Toyota Pew Center 
Tractebel lETA 
TransAlta lETA, Pew Center 
TUV lETA 
TXU Energy Trading Co. LP CCX 
United Technologies Pew Center 
Unocal IEfA 
Waste Management Inc. CCX 
Weyerhaeuser Pew Center 
Whirlpool Pew Center 
Wisconsin Energy Corp. CCX, Pew Center 
Woodside Energy lETA 
Xlaunch lETA 
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Countries & International Governing Bodies En&aged in Emissions Reductions: This table 
shows the countries and international agencies that are monitored by the International Emissions 
Trading Association (lETA). This table also provides brief descriptions of the trading program(s) 
that exist within each country and international governing body, as well as the program(s) planned 
for the future. The infonnation is from the lET A database, which can be searched in more detail at: 
http://www;pointcarbon.comlschemes.php?sysselect%5B%5D=-
1 &keywords%5B%5D=nature&submitbutton=Show+results. In most cases the program 
descriptions are taken directly from the lETA's databases,while other have been paraphrased. 
CoyntrII Internationol A2encI Pro2ram/ Proposal Descriptions 
Australia Proposed national cap-and-trade system. 
Australia - New South Wales Emissions trading scheme building on an existing 
emissions benchmarking program in connection 
with electricity retailer licensing conditions. 
Canada Plan includes emissions trading for large 
industrial emitters, increased invest in innovative 
technologies and taxes. 
Canada - CleanAir CanadaJ PERT The Pilot Emissions Reduction Trading Project 
(PERT), now CleanAir Canada, is a self-funded 
non-profit organisation allowing its members to 
register and trade emission reductions through its 
registry. 
Canada - GERT The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Pilot 
(GERT) is a voluntary partnership where 
participants can register abatement projects and 
trade carbon offsets. Projects are registed in 
Canada's Climate Change Voluntary Challenge & 
Registry. . 
Czech Republic 11 11 program initiated by the Czech Republic. 
Denmark Domestic cap and trade scheme. Legal basis in 
the C02 Quota Act passed in 2001. 
European Union Proposed community wide cap and trade system. 
Note that this section builds on the current 
proposal and that a final system, if approved, 
could be subject to substantial changes. 
France Voluntary industry-government agreements. 
Came about as an alternative to the broad-based 
national energy tax (a previous energy tax 
proposal was deemed unconstitutional by the 
European Council in December 2000). 
Germany Voluntary agreements are preferred over a 
trading approach. A 3-year pilot trading system 
has been described in an issue paper written by a 
. .goverflment-appointed working group on 
emissions trading. 
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Conntr!1 International Agenc! Programl ProDosal DescriDtions 
Japan A trial system for trading of GHG emission rights 
is planned for 2003. A voluntary GHG emissions 
registry is also being planned. 
Korea Korea will establish a national greenhouse gas 
emission registry system by 2004 and adopt an 
international carbon dioxide emissions trading 
(ET) system at a later stage. 
NAFfA Potential cross-border trading system proposed in 
a working paper by an expert advisory board to 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(CEC) of North America. Industry roundtables 
have also discussed trilateral trading schemes. 
Netherlands Proposal for national trading scheme. The 
scheme resembles the proposed EU cap and trade 
scheme, moving away from the first proposal by 
the Dutch C02 Trading Commission (VogtHinder 
Commissie). 
Netherlands - CAF An agreement between the Netherlands and CAF 
to establish a facility that will purchase GHG 
emission reduction credits. 
Netherlands - CERUPT The Certified Emission Reduction Units 
Procurement Tender (CERUPT) is a CDM 
procurement scheme where the Dutch 
government purchases GHG emission reductions 
in non-Annex 1 countries from companies from 
all over the world. 
Nertherlands - ERUPT The Emission Reduction Units Procurement 
Tender (ERUPT)-isa JI procurement programme 
where the Dutch government purchases GHG 
emission reductions from companies from all 
over the world. The scheme functions on a tender 
basis with shortlisting. 
Netherlands - mRD An agreement between the Netherlands and the 
mRD to establish a facility that will purchase 
GHG emission reduction credits. 
Netherlands - IFC An agreement between the Netherlands and the 
IFC to establish a facility that will purchase GHG 
emission reduction credits. 
Norway Domestic cap and trade system. 
Slovakia Proposed domestic C02 emissions trading 
system. To be fully compatible with the proposed 
EU cap and trade scheme. 
Sweden Proposal for a national trading scheme to replace 
theJ;Q4 .. ,@x, which is planned to be phased out by 
2005. Swedish climate change strategies dictate 
that the system should be fully compatible with 
the EU system. 
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L 
Countrl'l International Agenc! Programl Pronosal Descrintions 
Switzerland A voluntary system for C02 emissions 
reductions. 
United Kingdom National voluntary cap and trade. 
USA - Clean Power Group Multipollutant legislation with cap and trade 
system proposed by the Clean Power Group, 
consisting of the companies NiSource, Calpine, 
Trigen, and EI Paso. Enron used to be a member 
of the group but is no longer on the membership 
list. 
USA - Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 A bipartisan bill introduced by senators Joe 
Lieberman and John McCain in a U.S. Senate 
hearing in January 2003. The bill proposes a 
U.S. wide cap-and-trade system with an 
accompanying national greenhouse gas database. 
USA - Massachusetts Multipollutant legislation setting emissions 
standards for power plants. Draft regulations for 
a market based approach are expected later in 
2002. 
USA - New Hampshire The proposed New Hampshire Clean Power 
Strategy, released in January 2001, places caps on 
emissions from electricity generation. 
USA - New Jersey The New Jersey Open Market Emissions Trading 
(OMET) program and a GHG Trading Protocol 
Project. 
USA - Oregon Oregon requires new power plants to meet CO2 
emissions standards in order to receive site · 
certificates. Oregon established the Cliamte Trust 
to implement C02 offset projects, which may be 
used in future GHG regulatory or trading 
systems. 
World Bank - BioCF The BioCF aims to deliver cost-effective 
abatement and promote biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable development by financing 
demonstration sequestration projects in forest and 
agro-ecosystems. 
World Bank - CDCF Multilateral initia~ive launched by the World 
Bank in collaboration with the lETA. The fund 
will provide finance for reducing GHG emissions 
to small-scale projects in small developing 
countries and rural areas of all developing 
countries. 
World Bank - PCF Multilateral initiative for project financing 
intending to generate high quality emission 
];~~tipns from CDMlJI. The system operates 
under a closed-end mutual fund structure. 
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Foumlinl: Members of the Chical:o Climate Exchanl:e: This table lists the fourteen founding 
members of the Chicago Climate Exchange. The founders were announced in January of 2003. 
These 14 companies, and the City of Chicago, have agreed to reduce their GHG emissions 1 
percent below baseline in 2003, 2 percent in 2004, 3 percent in 2005 and 4 percent below baseline 
in 2006. The baseline is set as the average of annual emissions from 1998 through 2001 for each 
participant. (www.chicagoclimatex.com) 
Foundinl: Members of the CCX 
American Electric Power (AEP) 
. Baxter International Inc. 
City of Chicago 
DuPont 
Equity Office Properties Trust 
Ford Motor Company 
International Paper 
Manitoba Hydro 
MeadWestvaco Corporation 
Motorola, Inc. 
STMicroelectronics 
Stora Enso North America 
Temple-Inland Inc. 
Waste Management, Inc. 
BP's Internal Tradin2 Pr0l:ram' 
In 1998, BP Chairman and CEO Lord John Browne committed the company to reductions 
in "direct equity share" GHG emissions to 10 percent below the 1990 level. "Direct equity 
share" emissions are all of the GHG emissions produced by facilities BP owns completely plus the 
percent of emissions produced by partially BP-owned facilities, in proportion to BP's percentage of 
interest in these facilities. The 1990 baseline was 90.1 million tons (revised for the December 31, 
1998 merger with Amoco, which increased the baseline number of emissions), and in 2001 BP 
reported emissions totaling 80.5 million tons, a reduction of 9.6 million tons, or 10.6 percent less 
.~. "-? ''''' ~' . ;''' . .;;:. . 
than 1990 levels. Their reductions have been corroborated by outside auditors. BP also charged 
1 Information for this section of the Appendix comes from: BP Official Website. Climate _Change: Our 
Performance. Available online: 
<www.bp.comlenviron_sociallenvironmentlclimate_change/our_performance/index.asp> Accessed Feb. 19, 2003. 
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itself with reducing 2001 GHG emissions by 2 percent over the course of the year, and was more 
than successful. The company estimates that, on a net-pre sent-value basis over eight years, the fuel 
designed out of operating processes is worth about $650 million. 
BP achieved these impressive reductions using three main strategies: operational reduction, 
investment in capital projects and an internal ERC trading system. Figure One below, "greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions," shows where operational reductions were obtained in 2001. BP's ERC 
trading system links every BP operational site in the world through an internal website on which 
carbon dioxide credits are bought and sold among the different facilities. The year the trading 
program began, in 2000,2.7 million tons of carbon dioxide were traded at an average price of $7.60 
per ton. In 2001, 4.55 million tons of carbon were traded, and the average price was over four times 
higher than it was in 2000, and stood at $39.63 per ton. Per-ton prices in 2001 were volatile, too, 
ranging from $7 in January to $99 in September. Figure Two below, "carbon dioxide equivalent 
vintage: 2001 traded prices" charts the internal selling price of a ton of carbon dioxide over the 
course of 2001. Analysts at BP have concluded that the higher prices reflected stricter abatement 
targets set for 2001, which caused shortages of sellers at a few points during the year. The analysts 
also believe that those market conditions were caused in part by inaccurate forecasting of year-end 
abatement positions. BP plans to continue to operate its internal trading system as a teaching tool, 
and to plan additional internal and external emissions trading schemes.2 
2 Ibid. 
69 
.~ 
Figure One3 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
l.999 2000 2ool. 
,- - --"-_."--"'-------
• Energy efficiency 
• Flaring elimination 
• Reduced \I enti ng 
Figure TW04 
3 Chart copied from: BP Official Website. ClImate Change: Our Performance. Available online: 
<www.bp.com!environ_sociallenvironmentlclimate_change/oucperformancelindex.asp> Accessed Feb. 19, 2003. 
4 Ibid. 
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